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R are earth elements (REEs) or rareearth metals are a collection of
seventeen chemical elements in the
periodic table, namely scandium, yttrium,
and the fifteen lanthanides. Scandium
and yttrium are considered rare earth
elements since they tend to occur in the
same ore deposits as the lanthanides and
exhibit similar chemical properties.
This paper is designed to evaluate the
importance of rare earth elements. The
study explores China’s role in the supply-
demand equation and price mechanism
at large and, its implications. It also
examines the history of rare earth elements
and China’s current monopoly over the
industry, including possible repercussions
and strategic implications if rare earth
supply were to be disrupted. The study
provides insights into how widely traded
these minerals are and China’s positions
in the international trade both in terms
volume and value. The study investigates
who are the major customers and
analyses the various trade restrictions
imposed by China. The study capitulate
instructive and actionable data for
considering how China’s decreasing
exports, fresh technological uses, and
rising prices are setting up an
unprecedented discussion on the REEs.
Rare earths are critical component of
many high technology goods such as
hybrid vehicles, mobile telephones,
computers, televisions and energy efficient
lights. Although rare earths have relatively
a high unit value, the impact of their cost
has little, if any impact on the selling price
of the final item because they are present
in minute concentrations. RE elements
are also considered as strategically
important because of its uses in defense
and essential components to products
with high growth potential-electronics
and technology industries, energy
efficiency and greenhouse gas reduction.
Rare earth elements are important
ingredients in lasers, superconducting
magnets, batteries for hybrid automobiles;
Makers of hybrid cars use these elements
in their lanthanum nickel magnets to give
them greater rechargeable capabilities.
Portable x-ray units can function much
more effectively with thulium. Erbium-
doped fiber optic cables can amplify the
speed of communication. Night vision
goggles and rangefinder equipment use
rubidium to increase accuracy and
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visibility. Radar uses the samarium
cobalt magnet to withstand stresses as it
has the highest temperature rating of any
rare earth magnet.
China’s dominance in the RE supply
chain is directly related to Beijing’s
consistent and long term planning, which
dates back to as early as the 1950s.
However, the Chinese RE industry greatly
advanced when Xu Guangxian (also
known as “The Father of Chinese Rare
Earths Chemistry”) developed the Theory
of Countercurrent Extraction-which is
applicable for the separation of a mixture
with more than ten components such as
rare earths-in the 1970s. Since then,
China’s REO output has increased
rapidly from slightly over 1,000 tonnes
in 1978 to 11,860 tonnes in 1986, when
a production spike at the giant Bayan-
obo mine first propelled China past the
United States as the world’s leading
producer of REO. Meanwhile, Beijing has
continuously invested heavily in
technological innovations through key
national R&D programs, in order to gain
a decisive advantage in the rare earth
supply chain including mining,
separation, refining, forming and
manufacturing.
Most rare earth elements throughout
the world are found in deposits of the
minerals bastnaesite and monazite.
Bastnaesite deposits in the United States
and China account for the largest
concentrations of REEs, while monazite
deposits in Australia, South Africa, China,
Brazil, Malaysia, and India account for
the second largest concentrations of REEs.
Bastnaesite occurs as a primary mineral,
while monazite is found in primary
deposits of other ores and typically
recovered as a byproduct. Over 90% of the
world’s economically recoverable rare
earth elements are found in primary
mineral deposits i.e., in bastnaesite ores.
China supplies approximately 95% of
global demand and consumes about 60%
of the global supply, but its reserves of
rare earths are finite.
The Chinese government has
indicated that if the exploitation of these
resources is not controlled, they could be
exhausted in 20-30 years. These valuable
resource endowments are not evenly
distributed in China and about 83% of
the resources are located in Baiyunebo
(Baotou, Inner Mongolia), 8% in
Shandong province, 3% in Sichuan
province (light rare earth deposits of La,
Ce, Pr, Nd Sm, Eu). 3 percent of the
deposits located in Jiangxi province are
middle and heavy rare earth deposits
(Middle: Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho, Heavy: Er, Tm,
Yb, Lu, Sc, Y). In comparison, while most
of the global supply of heavy REs (e.g.
yttrium) originates in the “ion adsorption
clay” ores of Southern China, the proven
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reserves of heavy REs in the 7 Southern
Chinese provinces are a mere 1.5 Mt.
Since heavy REs are considered more
strategically valuable, significant efforts
have been made by Beijing in recent years
to crack down rampant illegal mining in
Southern China.
In fact, there are very few companies
outside China producing the metals. Inner
Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-
Tech Co. is China’s single largest producer
of the metals. China rare earth extraction
know how is currently unparalleled, the
necessary production capacities,
infrastructure and distribution channels
all exist and, on top of that, the country
benefits from fairly lax environment and
work place safety regulations and low
labour costs. China, which once focused
on exporting rare earths in their raw
forms, has shifted its end goal from
production to innovation. In the 1970s,
China was just exporting rare earth
mineral concentrates. By the 1990s, it
began producing magnets, phosphors and
polishing powders. Now, it is making
finished products like electric motors,
batteries, LCDs, mobile phones and so on.
There are few basic features of Chinese
supply that we can derive from the above
analysis. The facts include, China still hold
more than 25 million tonnes of rare earth
oxide reserves, excessive secondary
processing capacity and easy availability
of cheap processing chemicals, and heavy
investment in research and technology.
Moreover, the supply of Chinese heavy rare
earth are finite with 15- 20 years of mine
life, Chinese are rigorously regulating the
mines on environmental grounds. After
China gained decisive advantage in the
RE supply chain, Beijing’s restrictions on
REO production and exports in recent
years have been primarily motivated by
the strong political desire for resource
conservation.
World demand for rare earth elements
are estimated at 134,000 tonnes per year,
with global production around 124,000
tonnes annually. The difference is covered
by above-ground stocks or inventories.
World demand is projected to rise to
180,000 tonnes annually by 2012, while
it is unlikely that new mine output will
close the gap in the short term. By 2014,
global demand for rare earth elements
may exceed 200,000 tonnes per year.
China’s output may reach 160,000
tonnes per year (up from 130,000 tonnes
in 2008) in 2014.  An additional capacity
shortfall of 40,000 tonnes per year may
occur. This potential shortfall has raised
concerns in the major rare earth
consuming countries. New mining
projects could easily take 10 years for
development. In the long run, however, the
USGS expects that reserves and
undiscovered resources are large enough
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to meet demand. This expected growth,
coupled with the recent export cuts from
China, has end users of rare earths
scrambling for supplies.
Just as worldwide demand for REO
is growing so too is China’s own demand.
Data from the Chinese society of Rare
earths (CSRE) show that the country’s
consumption has grown rapidly since
2004 and reached over 70,000 tonnes in
2008. Growth in demand from China will
continue to outpace the rest of the world.
By the year of 2015, it is estimated that
the global demand of rare earths is
expected to reach 210 thousand tonnes.
It can be concluded that Rare Earth
Materials has become a major growth
point of China rare earth industry. China,
Japan and the United States are the
largest consumers of rare earth metals.
With the growing demand for ‘green’
products, the demand for rare earth metals
is only expected to increase. The annual
growth in demand is expected to hover
around 10%. China started a program
wherein it not only mined and produced
these rare earth elements but also
manufactured the finished goods. So, not
only does the country produce 97% of
the world’s REEs but also uses
approximately 70% of that material to
build products domestically. Thus, China
came to dominate the entire industry. The
most rapid growth has been in demand
from new materials, that include magnets,
phosphors, catalysts and batteries, which
now account for over 60% of the country’s
demand. This demand as no doubt been
and will continue to be fueled by heavy
investments in clean energy.
In China, rare earths were mainly
consumed in traditional areas of
metallurgy, machinery, petroleum
industry, chemical industry, light industry,
textile industry, agriculture, in new
materials like magnets, phosphors,
hydrogen storage, catalysts for
automobile exhaust and polishing
powder. There was a dramatic change in
the consumption structure, the
consumption of rare earths in new
materials increased very fast since 2004.
In 1988, the consumption of rare earths
in new materials was only 1%, but in
2007, it was 53%. In 2008, it was claimed
that about 60% of rare earths was
consumed in new materials in China.
China’s consumption of rare earth
elements is also expected to increase
dramatically as more and more foreign
companies move their production sites to
China to take advantage of the lower cost
of rare earths and therefore reduce their
overall production costs. This is part of
China’s larger strategy to maintain a tight
hold on the industry.
Rare earth elements are needed for
China’s expansion of its own military
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needs (aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and ballistic missiles).
Home-grown production needs will
further cut exports already reduced to
crippling levels. Not surprisingly, these
measures have raised real concerns outside
of China regarding the future availability
of the refined products created from
REMs. The rare earth supply chain for the
sleep paralyzed Western defense industries
is now being held hostage by the Chinese
who want to keep the rare earth metals
for their own rapidly expanding markets.
Rare earth prices remained static for
decades due to plentiful supplies, lulling
the high-tech industry into a false sense
of security. After Beijing cut export quotas
by 70 percent for the second half of 2010,
prices of some rare earths has gone up, as
much as 850 percent. Due to the
extensive management of rare earth
resource exploitation and scattered
distribution of the rare earth industry,
many foreign importers used the
opportunity to force down the price. When
the global demand for rare earth materials
increases year by year, China exported
6,100 tonnes of medium-end and low-end
rare earth products in 1990; the average
price was 13,600 USD/ton. In 2009,
China exported 36,100 tonnes of rare
earth smelting and separation products,
rising by 16.67% YOY. The export value
amounted to USD 310 million and the
average price was only 8,959 USD/ton
(China Research and Intelligence, 2010).
Low prices for rare earth elements from
China, contributed to cuts at the
Mountain Pass mine in the United States,
one of the main source of supply for many
years, before it closed in 2002. They also
discouraged most entrants to the industry
until the last two years, when prices began
to climb because of strong demand.
In 2009, China exported a total of
38573.02 tonnes but the total of all the
rare earths exported to 46 countries added
up to 40982.13 tonnes. The quantity and
the percentage share of the top 10
customers of China is indicated in the
below table. United States was the largest
importer of Chinese rare earths by
quantity and imported around 14700
tonnes of rare earths, these accounted for
38% of the Chinese exports. Japan
imported around 10500 tonnes and its
share amounted to 27%. North America
(mainly the United States) and Asia each
account for around 36% of the Chinese
rare earth exports by quantity. Around
24% is exported to Europe.
Until recently, the global dependency
on China for rare earths was a well-kept
secret. But word started to spread fast
after Beijing cut export quotas by 70 per
cent for the second half of 2010, sending
prices of some oxides - the purified form
of rare earth elements - up as much as
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850 per cent. The need for alternative
supplies from outside China suddenly
became obvious. The Chinese dominance
has raised concerns within industry
regarding prices and lead times for critical
defense hardware. With demand
increasing, the problem of purchasing
and shipping REEs for products is
concurrently growing.
The impact of Chinese interventions
in the domestic industry such as implicit
assistance to domestic downstream
processors of the targeted products and
thus providing them a competitive
advantage will have an impact on the
prices. China is seeking sustainability and
prices will respond to market demand and
supply from a sustainable base. Estimates
from Chinese government reports shows
that the “Chinese price” for rare earths is
about ¼ of the price that would result
from an environmentally sound, worker
friendly, profitable operation. This means
that the “real” price of rare earths is about
four times higher than the current China
price. An entire set of “green” industries
have grown up over the past ten years in
reliance on that China price. The danger
is that as the China price is phased out,
many of these green industries will prove
to be unprofitable. A primary example of
this risk is the electric car. Since the China
price for rare earths is virtually certain to
be phased out very quickly, this risk is
quite real. However, technological change
often brings sharp changes in demand,
which, in turn, may lead to strong price
volatility. An example is the tantalum
capacitor industry. Two-thirds of world
tantalum production is used in electronic
components. When the tantalum
price increased sharply in the late 1990s,
the electronics industry encouraged
capacitor designers to improve their
niobium capacitors and multiple
ceramics capacitors in order to replace the
tantalum components. The demand for
tantalum, and its price, fell sharply as a
result.
To control the supply China has
introduced a number of measures such as
imposing 15 percent of taxes on light rare
earths oxides and neodymium metal and,
25 percent tax on heavy rare earths and
other metals. Government has
recommended that the management of rare
earth mines should be consolidated under
three four main enterprises and has stepped
up efforts to restructure the rare earth
industry and has introduced favorable
policies, and is encouraging acquisitions and
mergers to restructure the sector. According
to plans, the Chinese government will bring
down the number of rare earth companies
from 90 to 20 within 2015. These measures
will have short – medium term
repercussions in the international market
and industrial applications.
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For China rare earth is the wild card
now. The Chinese government has stated
that its reserves of rare earths are finite and,
therefore, they will be developed
for the prime benefit of China’s
manufacturing industry. To help generate
manufacturing jobs and move up the value
chain, a series of measures has been
implemented to “conserve resources and to
maximize the benefits” of its rare earths
endowment. With a near monopoly in REO
production, the magnitude of the projected
shortage and its effects on industrial end
users across the globe will be heavily
influenced in the short and medium term
by China’s production and export policies.
vii
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R are earth elements (REEs) or rareearth metals are a collection of
seventeen chemical elements in the
periodic table, namely scandium, yttrium,
and the fifteen lanthanides. Scandium
and yttrium are considered rare earth
elements since they tend to occur in the
same ore deposits as the lanthanides and
exhibit similar chemical properties.
This paper is designed to evaluate the
importance of rare earth elements. The
study explores China’s role in the supply-
demand equation and price mechanism
at large and, its implications. It also
examines the history of rare earth elements
and China’s current monopoly over the
industry, including possible repercussions
and strategic implications if rare earth
supply were to be disrupted. The study
provides insights into how widely traded
these minerals are and China’s positions
in the international trade both in terms
volume and value. The study investigates
who are the major customers and
analyses the various trade restrictions
imposed by China. The study capitulate
instructive and actionable data for
considering how China’s decreasing
exports, fresh technological uses, and
rising prices are setting up an
unprecedented discussion on the REEs.
REEs were first discovered in 1787
by Lieutenant Carl Axel Arrhenius, a
Swedish army officer. Since then there has
1.  INTRODUCTION
Table 1: What are the rare earth elements?
* The author is thankful to Dr. Prahlada, Dr. K.D. Naik, Dr. S Sankaran and Dr. Anuradha Reddy for their valuable suggestions and
comments. Suggestions from Prof. Rajaram Nagappa, Prof. S. Chandrashekar, Prof. Lalitha Sundaresan, Dr. Manav Guha, Prof.
Ramani are gratefully acknowledged and thanks are due to other ISSSP faculties for their encouragement and help. I also would like
to thank Shruthi Shivabasavaiah for her editorial assistance.
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been a great deal of interest in their
chemical properties and potential uses.
From about the 1940s to the 1990s, REEs
attracted great interest in both the U.S.
and China’s academic and scientific
communities. Today, however, there are
only a small handful of scientists who
truly focus on REEs in the U.S. China, on
the other hand, could be setting itself up
to become a superpower in technological
innovation through its near monopoly
and its vast efforts in research and
development of REEs (Hurst Cindy,
2010).
Despite their name, rare earth
elements (with the exception of the highly
unstable promethium) are relatively
plentiful in the Earth’s crust, with cerium
being the 25th most abundant element
at 68 parts per million (similar to copper).
However, because of their geochemical
properties, rare earth elements are not
often found in concentrated and
economically exploitable forms or ores. It
was the very scarcity of these minerals
(previously called “earths”) that led to the
term “rare earth”. The first such mineral
discovered was gadolinite, a compound
of cerium, yttrium, iron, silicon and other
elements. Cerium, for example, ranks
number 26 in abundance among the
elements and is five times as common as
lead. And even the scarcest of rare earths,
Thulium, is more abundant than gold or
platinum. Because the elements share
similar chemical properties, most REEs
deposits contain a large number of all
17 elements in varying- albeit small-
concentrations. In addition, rare earths are
often of low quality, which has made the
material uneconomical to mine, and also
because the elements are usually found
within a cocktail of rare earths that need
to be separated in laborious process.
Figure 1: Basic materials supply chain
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Elemental materials are extracted from the
earth via mining. Next, they are processed
via separation and refining to obtain the
desired composition or purity. Materials
may be extracted either as major products,
where ore is directly processed to extract
the key materials or they may be co-
products or byproducts of other mining
operations. The co-production and by-
production processes create complex
relationships between the availability and
extraction costs of different materials,
which may cause supply curves and
market prices to vary in ways not captured
by simple supply and demand
relationships (DoE, US, 2010). Processed
materials are used to manufacture
component parts that are ultimately
assembled into end-use technologies. The
generic supply chain also shows the
potential for recycling and reusing
materials from finished applications,
though materials can be reclaimed at any
stage of the supply chain and reused either
upstream or downstream (DoE, US,
2010).
Rare earths are a critical component
of many high technology goods such as
hybrid vehicles, mobile telephones,
computers, televisions and energy efficient
lights. Although rare earths have relatively
a high unit value, the impact of their cost
has little, if any impact on the selling price
of the final item because they are present
in minute concentrations. RE elements
are also considered as strategically
important because of its uses in defense
and essential components to products
with high growth potential-electronics
and technology industries, energy
efficiency and greenhouse gas reduction.
Rare earth elements are important
ingredients in lasers, superconducting
magnets, batteries for hybrid automobiles;
Makers of hybrid cars use these elements
in their lanthanum nickel magnets to give
them greater rechargeable capabilities.
Portable x-ray units can function much
more effectively with thulium. Erbium-
doped fiber optic cables can amplify the
speed of communication. Night vision
goggles and rangefinder equipment use
rubidium to increase accuracy and
visibility. Radar uses the samarium
cobalt magnet to withstand stresses as it
has the highest temperature rating of any
rare earth magnet.
Even with a threefold increase in REE
demand over the past ten years, demand
is expected to increase even further, by
anywhere from 8 to 790 percent over the
next five years (Kientz R, 2010). While
REEs have been produced for almost a
century, the companies supplying them
have changed. In the mid-twentieth
century, almost all rare earth mining was
done at Mountain Pass, California. Today,
more than 97 percent of mining and
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refinement is done in China. The shift
occurred mainly due to the elaborative
separation and refining processes, which
is labor intensive, and raises safety and
environmental concerns. Not only do the
Chinese mine most of rare earths today,
they possess 36 percent of world reserves
(Hedrick. J B, 2010:129).
China’s dominance in the RE supply
chain is directly related to Beijing’s
consistent and long term planning, which
dates back to as early as the 1950s.
However, the Chinese RE industry greatly
advanced when Xu Guangxian (also
known as “The Father of Chinese Rare
Earths Chemistry”) developed the Theory
of Countercurrent Extraction-which is
applicable for the separation of a mixture
with more than ten components such as
rare earths-in the 1970s. Since then,
China’s REO output has increased
rapidly from slightly over 1,000 tonnes
in 1978 to 11,860 tonnes in 1986, when
a production spike at the giant Bayan-
obo mine first propelled China past the
United States as the world’s leading
producer of REO. Meanwhile, Beijing has
continuously invested heavily in
technological innovations through key
national R&D programs, such as the 863
and 973 projects, in order to gain a
decisive advantage in the rare earth supply
chain including mining, separation,
refining, forming and manufacturing
(Hurst Cindy, 2010:6).
According to China’s Ministry of
Science and Technology, the objective of
these program was to “advance in key
technological fields that concern the
national economy and national security;
and to achieve ‘leapfrog’ development in
key high-tech fields and take strategic
positions in order to provide high-tech
support to fulfill strategic objectives in
China’s modernization process”. In 1992
the late Chinese Prime Minister Deng
Xiaoping famously stated, “the Middle
East has oil, and China has rare earths”,
since then, China has not only remained
the world’s largest REO producer, but has
also successfully moved its manufacturers
up the supply chain (Hurst Cindy, 2010).
Since 1990, domestic consumption of
REO for high value-added product
manufacturing in China has increased at
13 percent annually, reaching 73,000
tonnes in 2009 (Song and Hong, 2010 ).
State-run labs in China have consistently
been involved in research and
development of REEs for over fifty years.
The Rare Earth Materials Chemistry and
Applications which is affiliated with
Peking University and focused on rare
earth separation techniques and, the lab
based at Changchun Institute of Applied
Chemistry. Additional labs concentrating
RARE EARTH ELEMENTS IN CHINA: GROWTH, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS
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on rare earth elements include the
Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths,
the largest rare earth research institution
in the world, established in 1963, and
the General Research Institute for
Nonferrous Metals established in
1952(Hurst Cindy, 2010:9). This long
term outlook and investment has yielded
significant results for China’s rare earth
industry.
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2.1 Rare Earth Element - Reserves
Reserves are the resources that could
be economically extracted or produced at
the time of determination. The term
reserves need not signify that extraction
facilities are in place and operative.
Globally, the four principal high-yield
REE-bearing minerals are bastnäsite,
monazite, xenotime and ion absorption
clays. A mineral deposit that does not fall
in any of these four categories typically
requires more metallurgical testing to
establish the mineralogy and processing
steps. The rare earth content of each
deposit is essential to estimating the
deposit’s profitability. It determines how
the ore will be processed and how
complicated it will be to separate the rare
earth elements from each other. Most rare
earth elements throughout the world are
found in deposits of the minerals
bastnaesite and monazite. Bastnaesite
deposits in the United States and China
account for the largest concentrations of
REEs, while monazite deposits in
Australia, South Africa, China, Brazil,
2.  RESERVES,
PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY
Source: United States Geological Survey Mineral and Commodity Summaries
Figure 2: REE world reserves
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Malaysia, and India account for the
second largest concentrations of REEs.
Bastnaesite occurs as a primary mineral,
while monazite is found in primary
deposits of other ores and typically
recovered as a byproduct. Over 90% of the
world’s economically recoverable rare
earth elements are found in primary
mineral deposits i.e., in bastnaesite ores
(Marc Humphries, 2010).
According to the US Geological
survey, total known reserves word wide
amounted roughly 99 million tonnes at
the end of 2009, which would last 800
years, provided production remained
unchanged at the current level of
approximately 124 thousand tonnes
compared with its peak of 137 thousand
tonnes in 2006, rare earth out put has
thus come down some 9 per cent.
There are three primary criteria, among
others, that determine the economic
feasibility of a potential rare earth mine:
tonnage, grade and the cost of refining the
rare earth mineral. A mine may be
economically viable (and therefore
attractive to investors) if a low-grade
(<5%) ore occurred with large tonnage and
familiar mineralogy or if high-grade ore
occurred with familiar mineralogy. Heavy
rare earths (atomic numbers 65–71), such
as terbium and dysprosium, along
with yttrium (atomic number 39), are
somewhat more scarce and often
concentrated in ionic adsorption clay
and xenotime, commonly found in
southeastern China (Hedrick James B,
1997:471).
China supplies approximately 95% of
global demand and consumes about 60%
of the global supply, but its reserves of
rare earths are finite. The Chinese
government has indicated that if the
exploitation of these resources is not
controlled, they could be exhausted in
20-30 years. These valuable resource
endowments are not evenly distributed in
China and about 83% of the resources are
located in Baiyunebo (Baotou, Inner
Mongolia), 8% in Shandong province, 3%
in Sichuan province (light rare earth
deposits of La, Ce, Pr, Nd Sm, Eu ). 3
percent of the deposits located in Jiangxi
province are middle and heavy rare
earth deposits (Middle: Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho,
Heavy: Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, Sc, Y). In
comparison, while most of the global
supply of heavy REs (e.g. yttrium)
originates in the “ion adsorption clay” ores
of Southern China, the proven reserves of
heavy REs in the 7 Southern Chinese
provinces are a mere 1.5 Mt (Huatai
United Securities, 2010). Since heavy REs
are considered more strategically valuable,
significant efforts have been made by
Beijing in recent years to crack down
rampant illegal mining in Southern
China.
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Reserves of medium and heavy rare
earths may only last 15 to 20 years at
the current rate of production, which could
lead to China being forced to imports
supplies. Medium and heavy rare earth,
also known as ion-adsorbed-type rare
earth, is more valuable than the lighter
variety. It is used in advanced areas such
as missiles. China’s verified reserves of
ion-adsorbed-type rare earth stood at 8
million tonnes in 2008, while reserves of
light rare earth totaled 50 to 60 million,
according to data from the Ministry of
Land and Resources.
Fujian, the province with the country’s
third richest rare earth reserve, is building
an integrated rare earth industrial park
near one of the country’s most productive
heavy rare earth mineral deposits. Located
at south Changting, the 10 sq km park
with an investment of 6 billion yuan
($905 million) is expected to be ready by
2015, according to the Chinese Society of
Rare Earth.
China’s rare earth resources are
widely distributed throughout the
country. The scattered distribution
makes it difficult to carry out efficient
oversight of the industry. The 2009-2015
Plan aims to create ‘large rare earth
districts’ to simplify management of
China’s rare earth resources. The new
plan will divide China’s industry into
three large districts -south, north, and
west. The southern district would
comprise of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian,
Hunan, and Guangxi; the northern
district would be centered on Inner
Country Reserves % of ReserveBase* % of
(Million Metric total (Million Metric total
Tonnes )  Tonnes)
United States 13.0 13 14 9.3
China 3 6 3 6 8 9 59 .3
Russia & CIS 19 19 21 14
Australia 5.4 5 5.8 3.9
India 3 .1 3 1 .3 1
Brazil Small
Malaysia Small
Others 22.0 22 23 12.5
Total 99 .0 154 .0
Source: Marc Humphries 2010
Table 2: The world wide resreves of rare earth elements as of 2009
*Reserve  Base is defined by USGS to include reserves(both economic and marginally economic)plus some
subeconomic  resources(with potential for becoming economic reserves).
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Mongolia and Shandong and the western
district would consolidate mines located
in Sichuan (Hurst Cindy, 2010). China
is also reported to have around 84
deposits /mines of rare earths, spread over
18 provinces. The proposed consolidated
rare earth districts will most likely be
under the direction of one company. If
successful, the new consolidation could
dramatically affect China’s ability to
control the flow of rare earths. During
this consolidation process there may be
unexpected supply shortages because of
shutdowns or increased availability of
products due to new efficiencies. The
details of the number of mines operating
in various provinces are indicated in
table 3.
Interestingly, the data suggests that
China has controlled output successfully
since 2006 as it sought to consolidate the
domestic industry into a handful of players.
China has long lagged behind the U.S.
technologically. However, as of the early
1990s, China’s vast rare earth resources
have propelled the country into the number
one position in the industry. Additionally,
China has set out on an expansive effort to
increase its overall technological innovation,
effort which includes the use of rare earth
elements. China’s academic focus on rare
earth elements could one day give the
country a decisive advantage over
technological innovation.
2.2 Production of Rare Earth
Elements
In fact, there are very few companies
outside China producing the metals. Inner
Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-
Tech Co. is China’s single largest producer
of the metals. China rare earth extraction
Source: Greta J. Orris and Richard I. Grauch (2002)
Table 3: Rare earth deposits/mines in China
Province No. of Mines Province No. of Mines
Fujian 3 Jiangxi 8
Gansu 1 Jilin 1
Guangdong 17 Liaoning 2
Guangxi 7 Shandong 2
Guizhou 3 Shanxi 1
Hainan 6 Sichuan 4
Hebei 3 Xinjiang 1
Hubei 3 Yunan 3
Hunan 12 Not Known 2
Inner Mongolia 5 Total 8 4
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know how is currently unparalleled, the
necessary production capacities,
infrastructure and distribution channels
all exist and, on top of that, the country
benefits from fairly lax environment and
work place safety regulations and low
labour costs. China, which once focused
on exporting rare earths in their raw
forms, has shifted its end goal from
production to innovation. In the 1970s,
China was just exporting rare earth
mineral concentrates. By the 1990s, it
began producing magnets, phosphors and
polishing powders. Now, it is making
finished products like electric motors,
batteries, LCDs, mobile phones and so on.
REE Production Trends
The significant cost advantage for
Chinese producers, which has crushed
almost all overseas competitors, is not
only driven by low labor costs, but also
unintentionally reinforced by Beijing’s
policy failures in regulating the resource
extraction sector as a whole, and the RE
industry in particular. To keep pace
with its booming economy, Beijing
promulgated the so-called “Let Water Flow
Rapidly” (You Shui Kuai Liu) policy in
1981 to stimulate a rapid spike in
resource demand without appropriate
considerations of environmental
protection, safety and sector
consolidation. The lack of entrance
standards and patent enforcement led to
a proliferation of small scale and
technologically backward mines and
separation plants.
Media reports have often pegged
China’s rare earth cost advantage on poor
environmental standards, which are a
problem in the chaotic mining operations
Figure 3: Chinese rare earth industry in the international context
Source: United States Geological Survey, formatted by CSIS
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in Southern China (Tu Kevin J, 2010).
But the truth, according to experts, is that
China’s largest source of rare earths does
not even come from a rare earth mine.
Rather, it comes out of the tailings (or
waste material) from the giant Baotou
iron ore mine in the province of Inner
Mongolia in Northern China. A cheap
processing method is used to covert them
into high-purity product. As production
from these sources continued to ramp
up in the 1990s, there was massive
overcapacity built in China, and prices
collapsed. The Chinese government
introduced the first export quotas in
1999. In less than one decade, the
permanent magnet market experienced a
complete shift in leadership. Whereas in
1998, 90 percent of the world’s magnet
production was in the United States,
Europe, and Japan, today, rare earth
magnets are sold almost exclusively by
China or using Chinese rare earth oxides.
China is now facing the possibility that
reserves of medium and heavy rare earths
might run dry within 15 to 20 years if
the current rate of production is
maintained.
The table 4 reveals that the production
in Bayan Obo remains the largest REE
industry in China contributing almost
half of the total production. The
production has been constant between the
periods 2006 and 2008 ranging between
125- 140 thousand tonnes. China has
greatly reduced the production of REE to
110-130 thousand tonnes by the end of
2010 and also restricted the exports
through various quota systems which will
be discussed in detail in section four. The
table also provides the estimated level of
REE production in China for the year
2014, increased production of 80-100
thousand tones in Bayan Obo and
160-170 thousand tonnes of total
production.
Year Bayan Obo Sichuan Ion Monazite Total
Bastnasite Bastnasite Adsorpt ion
clays
2004 42-48,000 20-24,000 28-32,000        - 9-100,000
2006 45-55,000 22-26,000 40-50,000 8-12,000 125-140,000
2008 60-70,000 10-15,000 45-55,000 8-12,000 125-140,000
2010 55-65,000 10-15,000 35-45,000 4-8,000 110-130,000
2014 80-100,000 20-40,000 40-50,000 8-12,000 160-170,000
Table 4: Chinese production of rare earth chemical concentrates 2004-14
Note: Illegal or uncontrolled mining and processing is not included. It has amounted to 10-20,000t pa REO over the last
3-5 years
Source: IMCOA, CREIC, Baogang Rare Earth Hi-Tech, Sichuan RE Association, GRIREM
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2.3 Supply of Rare Earth Elements
The supply of a material is a function
of resources, reserves and production.
“Resources” include identified and
undiscovered resources. Production
generally occurs in countries with large
resources and reserves, but exceptions
exist. In some cases, small reserve holders
may also produce the material, while
countries with no reserves could be a
major refinery producer of imported
primary or raw material.
There was still more than enough
supply reaching other markets and there
was no real talk of a problem in the sector
until the past couple of years, when
growing global demand for rare earths
highlighted the fact that China had put
everyone else out of business. Comments
from Chinese government officials started
to suggest that they view the industry as
more strategic than ever before, and were
intent on securing more supply for
domestic use. They started taking
measures to consolidate domestic supply
and reduce smuggling. Analysts are of the
opinion that by 2012, the rest of the world
could face a major supply crisis because
of China’s reduced or zero supply. The
demand-supply is expected to touch
30,000–40,000 tonnes by 2012 in the
absence of any new large supplier (David
Anthony, 2010). The growing economy of
China is creating a worldwide risk to
supply and China’s growing consumption
limits its exports of rare earths. China
insists that it requires the high supplies
to meet the demands of its clean energy
and high-tech sectors.
Most of the rare earth enterprises
locate around the large rare earth mines,
such as Baotou city, Sichuan province and
Ganzhou city. There are about 24
enterprises for rare earth concentrate
production, and 100 rare earth enterprises
for smelting separation production in
China. Most of the REE supply originated
from the Baotou plant was about 55000t
and the total supply from China were
about 103300t in 2010. The global
supply increased to 15000 in 2010 from
the 2005 level of 10500t to meet the
increasing demand from the automotive
and technology sectors.
The table 5 reveals a number of
developments in production and supply
of rare earths by 2014 and shows that a
10 percent increase in production at
Baotou plant from 2010 to14 and full
production quota to be utilized at
Sichuan with production of 20000t. The
supply from Iconic clay regions will be
reduced to 30000t by 2014 with a little
increase in supply from recycling in China.
Chinese restrictions on supply in 2010
have triggered many countries too look
for alternative sources and by 2014 a
number countries will be in a position to
RARE EARTH ELEMENTS IN CHINA: GROWTH, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS
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supply some amount of rare earth as the
data shows that the mount weld mine in
Australia is expected to supply about
22000t and mountain pass in California
is expected to supply 20000 tonnes along
with supplies from Russia, CIS countries
and India. One of the largest growth areas
is expected to be the production of hybrid
vehicles, such as the Toyota Prius. Each
hybrid car contains 16 kg of rare earths,
predominantly in its batteries and electric
motors (Lun Joe, 2006).
The table also shows that the supply
from recycling in China increases
marginally from 3300t in 2010 to 4000t
in 2014 and from 1500t to 1800t in
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global supply. The reuse and recycling
capacity currently limited as recovery of
manufacturing waste and measurable
recovery from aftermarket products are yet
to develop. Also recycling them is often
difficult and expensive, because they are
often mixed with other materials when
products are made. And there is little
economic incentive to recycle, since rare
earth elements are available raw on the
world market at comparatively low prices.
However, improved designs for recycling
coupled with larger streams of materials
could eventually allow for the economical
recycling and reuse of magnetic materials.
Table 6 shows that most of the oxides
are produced at different mine sites in
China. The industry in Malaysia is largely
dependent on the ores from Australia.
Most analysts believe China will
eventually change its quota system to
restrict the rare earths individually.
Because China has an abundance of light
rare earths available through the Bayan
Obo project in Mongolia, changing the
quota system would likely trigger a
sudden flood of cerium and lanthanum
on to the market. Even with new mines
coming online within the next five years,
analysts are forecasting a shortage of
heavy rare earths terbium and
dysprosium by 2015, and a very tight
supply of light rare earths neodymium
and praseodymium. Of note is that nearly
all rare earth deposits contain the
radioactive material thorium and the cost
of treating and storing thorium is an
important factor in evaluating the
economics of a mine. This may be
particularly true to the rare earth
Table 6: Rare earths types and contents of major contributing source minerals
supplying REEs to the global market (percentage of total rare earth oxides)
L I G H T M E D I U M H E A V Y
Source: U.S Department of Energy (2010)
T Y P E Location (s) L a C e P r N d S m E u G d T b D y H o E r T m Y b L u Y
Currently Active:
Bastnasite Byan obo Inner
Mongolia 23 50 6.2 18.5 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Xenomite Lahat, perak,
Malaysia 1.2 3.1 0.5 1.6 1.1 0 3.5 0.9 8.3 2.0 6.4 1.1 6.8 1 61
Rare earth laterite Xunwu, Jianxi
China 43.4 2.4 9.0 31.7 3.9 0.5 3.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.1 8
Ion adsorption Longnan,Jianxi,
clays China 1.8 0.4 0.7 3.0 2.8 0.1 6.9 1.3 6.7 1.6 4.9 0.7 2.5 0.4 65
Loparite Lovozerskaya,
Russia 28 57.5 3.8 8.8 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Various India 23 46 5 20 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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production in Kerala, India where the
deposits of thorium is very high.  In
general, each rare earth ore body is unique
and requires a site-specific processing
system. As a result, production costs vary
from deposit to deposit based on ore
content and mineralogy.
The development of increased
stockpiling of REE in China has gained
momentum in recent years with assertion
of government authority in recent years
over mining regions. The Chinese
stockpiling, under the direction of the
Ministry of Land and Resources, began
with a pilot project in early 2010 in
China’s primary mining region of Baotou
in Inner Mongolia. At least 10 storage
facilities are being built and managed by
the world’s largest producer of rare-earth
metals; government-controlled Baotou
Steel Rare-Earth (Group) Hi-Tech Co.
Chinese state media reports say stockpiles
may eventually top 100,000 metric tonnes
(James T. Areddy, 2011). The move to
build reserves comes as China’s supply
of rare-earth metals to the rest of the world
already is shrinking despite growing
demand for the elements. In response to
Chinese restrictions on supply the high-
tech-focused nations of U.S, The European
Union, Japan and South Korea, all of
which are dependent on China for rare-
earth supplies, have highlighted
stockpiling strategies.
There are few basic features of Chinese
supply that we can derive from the above
analysis. The facts include, China still hold
more than 25 million tonnes of rare earth
oxide reserves, excessive secondary
processing capacity and easy availability
of cheap processing chemicals, and heavy
investment in research and technology.
Moreover, the supply of Chinese heavy rare
earth are finite with 15- 20 years of mine
life, Chinese are rigorously regulating the
mines on environmental grounds. After
China gained decisive advantage in the
RE supply chain, Beijing’s restrictions on
REO production and exports in recent
years have been primarily motivated by
the strong political desire for resource
conservation.
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T he two major drivers ofdemand for mineral
commodities are the rate of overall
economic growth, (stable or decline) and
the state of development for principal
material applications (e.g., clean energy
technologies). Demand for key materials
in clean energy technologies compete for
available supply with demand for the
same materials in other applications.1
With 1.3 billion people and the fastest
growing economy in the world, China is
faced with the challenging task of
ensuring it has adequate natural resources
to sustain economic growth. There is also
a growing school of thought that China
is not actually able, at present, to use all
of the materials allocated for domestic use
only.  “Out of a production level of perhaps
100,000 tonnes of total rare earth oxides
in past years,” the bulk of that material
has ended up being purchased by end-
users in first-world nations (US DOE,
2010).
World demand for rare earth elements
are estimated at 134,000 tonnes per year,
with global production around 124,000
tonnes annually. The difference is covered
by above-ground stocks or inventories.
World demand is projected to rise to
180,000 tonnes annually by 2012, while
it is unlikely that new mine output will
close the gap in the short term. By 2014,
global demand for rare earth elements
may exceed 200,000 tonnes per year.
China’s output may reach 160,000
tonnes per year (up from 130,000 tonnes
in 2008) in 2014.  An additional capacity
3.  DEMAND AND INDUSTRIAL
APPLICATIONS OF RARE EARTH
ELEMENTS
1 Generally and with respect to the key materials, demand for end-use items for building use (e.g., phosphors
for lighting) or construction tend to be more cyclical, whereas those that enter big-ticket consumer items
such as cars tend to be more volatile and sensitive to short-term economic movements. Uses that enter
portable devices and personal consumer goods (e.g., batteries for portable electronics) tend to experience
more stable demand. Regional factors are important also: China’s and India’s rapid economic growth
have had and will continue to have a huge impact on global demand for mineral commodities (Eggert RG,
2010).
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shortfall of 40,000 tonnes per year may
occur. This potential shortfall has raised
concerns in the major rare earth
consuming countries. New mining
projects could easily take 10 years for
development. In the long run, however, the
USGS expects that reserves and
undiscovered resources are large enough
to meet demand. This expected growth,
coupled with the recent export cuts from
China, has end users of rare earths
scrambling for supplies.
Just as world wide demand for REO
is growing, so too is China’s own demand.
Data from the Chinese society of Rare
earths (CSRE) show that the country’s
consumption has grown rapidly since
2004 and reached over 70,000 tonnes in
2008. Growth in demand from China will
continue to outpace the rest of the world.
By the year of 2015, it is estimated that
the global demand of rare earths is
expected to reach 210 thousand tonnes;
China’s domestic demand will be 138,000
tonnes. By 2020, China’s domestic
demand is expected to reach 190,000
tonnes, including 130,000 tonnes
consumed in high-tech fields, account for
68% of global total consumption. It can
be concluded that Rare Earth Materials
has become a major growth point of China
rare earth industry (Chen Zhanheng,
2010). China, Japan and the United
States are the largest consumers of rare
earth metals. With the growing demand
for ‘green’ products, the demand for rare
earth metals is only expected to increase.
The annual growth in demand is expected
to hover around 10%. China started a
program wherein it not only mined and
produced these rare earth elements but
also manufactured the finished goods. So,
Figure 4: Forecast global demand for rare earths by market in 2014
(t REO ±15%)
Source IMCOA, Roskill, 2010
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not only does the country produce 97%
of the world’s REEs but also uses
approximately 70% of that material to
build products domestically. Thus, China
came to dominate the entire industry.
The most rapid growth has been in
demand from new materials, that include
magnets, phosphors, catalysts and
batteries, which now account for over 60%
of the country’s demand. This demand as
no doubt been and will continue to be
fueled by heavy investments in clean
energy.
The Figure shows the Chinese
consumption of rare earths from 1990 to
2008. It can be noticed that the
consumption of rare earths in China
increased rapidly since 2004. During the
last 20 years from 1990 to 2008, China
annual consumption increased from 1
thousand tonnes to 72.6 thousand tonnes,
it was a tremendous increase of 72.6
times. The consumption was 67.68
thousand tonnes in 2008, a slight decrease
compared with that in 2007. The main
reason for this tremendous growth is
that ever increasing production of
manufacturing items in china such
wind mills, solar panels, electronic
commodities.
High-technology and environmental
applications of the rare earth elements
have grown dramatically in diversity and
importance over the past four decades.
Many of these applications are highly
specific and substitutes for REE’s are
inferior or unknown. REE’s have acquired
a level of technological significance much
Source: Chen Zhanheng, 2010
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greater than expected from their relative
obscurity. These uses range from
mundane (lighter flints, glass polishing)
to high-tech (phosphors, lasers, magnets,
batteries, magnetic refrigeration) to
futuristic (high-temperature
superconductivity, safe storage and
transport of hydrogen for a post-
hydrocarbon economy). The rare earth
elements are essential for a diverse and
expanding array of high-technology
applications (Quantum Rare Earth
Development Corp, 2011).
The table 7 depicts the REE products
and their applications. Dysprosium and
terbium are alloyed into rare earths
magnets to make them capable of
operating at elevated temperatures. At
current alloying levels, dysprosium and
terbium make up about 5% of the metal
used in these car battery magnets. The
majority of applications depend on the
rare earth magnets. China exported
10,000 tonnes of rare earth magnets
worth $400 million and 34,600 tonnes
of other rare earth products worth $500
million in 2008. The rare earths market
represented approximately USD 1.25
billion in 2008. Over the past decade,
market growth has been in the range of
8-11% per year, with the exception of the
correction in 2001/02 due to the fall in
technology markets and the global
economic crisis. While the global financial
and economic crisis in 2009 reduced
consumption of REE, the industry growth
Table 7: Major products and applications of rare earth products
Rare Earths Products Industrial applications
Nd, Pr, Sm, Magnets Demand for large magnets for permanent magnet motors in
Tb, Dy HEVs, EVs, and Maglev trains, also increased demand for
HDDs and ODDs, mobile phones, MP3 playes, cameras, VCMs
La, Ce, Pr, Nd Battery alloy Rising demand for HEVs
Eu, Y, Tb, La, Dy, Phosphors Increased use of energy efficient fluresent lights, also growing
Ce, Pr, Gd demand for LCDs, PDPs
La, Ce, Pr, Nd Fluid cracking Increased use of catalysts in processing heavy crude and tar
catalysts sands
Ce, La, Nd Auto catalysts Tighter NOx and Sox standards – offset to some extent by
increased use of zirconia in the wash coat
Ce, La, Nd Polishing Increased demand for mechano- chemical polishing of
powders electronic components, and some types of LCd screens
La,Ce, Pr, Nd, Y Ceramics Growth in use of multi-layer ceramic capacitors, use of PSZ
in advanced applications
Notes: HEV = Hybrid Electric Vehicle, EV = Electric Vehicle
HDD = Hard Disc Drive;   ODD = Optical Disc Drive;    VCM = Voice Coul Motor;   LCD = Liquid Crystal Display;
CRT = Cathode Ray Tube;   PSZ = Partially Stabilised Zirconia
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returned to 8-11% in late 2010
(Kingsnorth D, 2010).
Table 8 reveals a number features of
rare earth demand in 2008. The Chinese
demand constitutes about 67 percent of
global demand followed by Japan and
North East Asian countries and USA.
Magnets, metal alloys and catalysts
were in high demand compare other
applications and these are highly used in
industrial applications of hybrid vehicles,
electronic vehicles, hard disc drive, optical
disc drive, voice coul motor, liquid crystal
display, cathode ray tubes and petroleum
refining industries. The demand for
magnets was equal to21 percent followed
by 20 percent demand for catalysts and
about 18 percent demand for metal alloys.
Magnets phosphors and metal alloys are
the largest end uses for rare earths by
value.
In China and globally, REEs have
experienced fast growth in advanced
technology sectors including luminescent
(phosphors), magnetic, catalytic and
hydrogen storage technologies. The demand
by clean energy technology sectors is largely
a result of the ramp-up of clean energy
technology manufacturing and use by the
United States, other Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) nations and China. Magnets
dominated REE usage by weight in 2008,
with catalysts claiming the second-highest
usage and metal alloys accounting for the
third highest (Kingsnorth and Chegwidden
2010). REE consumption has grown most
rapidly in China. China’s 2005 REO
demand exceeded half of global demand for
the first time and more than tripled in
absolute terms between 2000 and 2008
(Chen Z 2010).
Table 8: Global rare earths demand in 2008 in tonnes and by value
Application China Japan & U S A Others Total Volume Total
NE Asia %  value %
Catalysts 9000 3000 9500 3500 25000 20% 5%
Glass 7500 2000 1000 1500 12000 10% 2%
Polishing 8000 4500 1000 1500 15000 12% 4%
Metal Alloys 15500 4500 1250 1000 22500 18% 14%
Magnets 21000 3500 750 1000 26250 21% 37%
Phosphors 5500 2500 500 500 9000 7% 31%
Ceramics 2500 2500 1250 750 7000 6% 4%
Other 5000 2000 250 250 7500 6% 3%
Total 74000 24500 15500 10000 124000 100% US$6.75b
Source: Roskill, IMCOA, 2010 and author’s calculations
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In China, rare earths were mainly
consumed in traditional areas of
metallurgy, machinery, petroleum
industry, chemical industry, light industry,
textile industry, agriculture, in new
materials like magnets, phosphors,
hydrogen storage, catalysts for
automobile exhaust and polishing
powder. There was a dramatic change in
the consumption structure, the
consumption of rare earths in new
materials increased very fast since 2004.
In 1988, the consumption of rare earths
in new materials was only 1%, but in
2007, it was 53%. In 2008, it was claimed
that about 60% of rare earths was
consumed in new materials in China.
China’s consumption of rare earth
elements is also expected to increase
dramatically as more and more foreign
companies move their production sites to
China to take advantage of the lower cost
of rare earths and therefore reduce their
overall production costs. This is part of
China’s larger strategy to maintain a tight
hold on the industry.
In 2009, China produced about 7,200
tonnes of rare earth fluorescent powder,
ranking the world Top. The three-band
fluorescent lamp industry consumed 75%
of rare earth luminescent materials as the
major application area of luminescent
materials. The three-band fluorescent
lamp with the advantages of energy
Figure 6: China: consumption structure of rare earths from 1988 to 2008
Source: The Chinese Society of Rare Earth, Nomura International Hong Kong
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saving and long lifespan will gradually
replace the incandescent lamp. In 2009,
China produced over 3 billion three-band
fluorescent lamps. If 80% of the
incandescent lamps are replaced, 3 billion
three-band fluorescent lamps will be
needed every year. Hence, the annual
demand for fluorescent powder is about
10,000 tonnes. By 2015, the total
demand for three-band fluorescent powder
will be about 60,000 tonnes.
In 2008, the consumption of rare
earth polishing powder in the world was
20,000 tonnes, including 8,000 tonnes
for LCD. In recent years, with the booming
of the LCD industry, high-performance
polishing powder has achieved fast
development. Presently, the production
capacity of rare earth polishing powder
in China exceeded 150 million tonnes. It
is forecast that China’s annual production
capacity of rare earth polishing powder
will reach 20,000 tonnes in 2010. In
2009, the rare earth consumed in Chinese
petrochemical catalytic cracking sector
was about 7,500 tonnes. It is forecast that
China’s crude oil processing volume will
maintain over 500 million tonnes in
2015-2020. The rare earth for FCC
catalysts will exceed 10,000 tonnes.
Besides, with the considerable growth of
the demand for rare earth catalytic
materials in the fields of fuel cell, water
pollution control, air purification, etc.,
China’s total demand for rare earth
catalytic materials will exceed 17,000
tonnes in 2015-2020 (China Research
and Intelligence, 2010).
Because of their ability to readily
give up and accept electrons, the rare
earth elements have become uniquely
indispensable in many electronic, optical,
magnetic and catalytic applications. From
iPods to catalytic converters, from wind
power generators to computer disc drives
and hybrid electric vehicles - Rare Earth
applications are ubiquitous and critical
for the overall economic well being of any
country. China is most interested in
supplying its domestic needs first.
Because there’s such a wide range of
products that use rare earth elements, its
domestic REE-product industry is
growing rapidly. China’s doing everything
it can to bring new investment into the
country and develop new industries to use
this material; for example, it will sell REEs
to local industries at a much cheaper price
than it sells the same material to sources
outside of China. In that sense, it’s trying
to do everything it can to increase the
country’s internal need.
The data released by Lynas Corp
shows that global supplies of rare-earth
elements will fall short of demand, which
will grow by an average of 9 percent
annually to the year 2014. The largest
growth rate will be in demand for magnets
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and battery alloys which would be 12
percent and 15 percent respectively by
2014. Total demand for the group of
elements, used in products such as
industrial magnets, flat-screen TVs, and
military weapons systems, is likely to grow
to 190,100 metric tonnes in 2014, from
136,100 tonnes in 2010. For example,
permanent magnet demand is expected
to grow by 10%-16% per year through
2014. Demand for rare earths in auto
catalysts and petroleum cracking
catalysts is expected to increase between
6% and 8% each year over the same
period. Demand increases are also
expected for rare earths in flat panel
displays, hybrid vehicle engines, and
defense and medical applications. The
global demand in value terms will grow
from US$7.8 billion in 2010 to 11.2
billion in 2014.
3.1 Consumption and Industrial
Applications
The rare earth elements as a group
have magnetic, chemical and
spectroscopic properties that have led to
their application in wide range of end-
uses.   These metals are utilized in a broad
range of manufacturing areas that include
materials, machineries and electronics.
These are the raw materials for high value
added products. Although often needed
only in small quantities, these metals are
increasingly essential to the development
of technologically sophisticated products.
They play a critical role in the development
of innovative ‘environmental technologies’
Table 9: Global rare earths demand in tonnes 2010 & 2014
Appl i ca t ion D e m a n d Vo l u m e Va l u e D e m a n d G r o w t h Va l u e
t o n n e s ( % ) ( % )  tonnes 2014 rate p.a. (%) ( % )
Magnets 35000 26% 38% 55100 12% 42%
Battery Alloys 18600 14% 10% 32500 15% 13%
Metallurgy ex battery 11700 9% 7% 12700 2% 5%
Auto Catalysts 9000 7% 5% 12200 8% 4%
Fluid cracking
Catalysts 21300 16% 11% 24900 4% 9%
Polishing 19100 14% 10% 28000 10% 10%
Glass 7800 6% 4% 7800 0% 3%
Phosphors 7900 6% 10% 10800 8% 10%
Others 5700 4% 5% 6100 6% 5%
Total 136 100 100% US$7.8 bln 190100 9% 11.2 b
Source: Lynas Corp, 2010
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to boost energy efficiency and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Demand for rare
earths, often referred to as “industrial
vitamins,” will only increase.  Several clean
energy technologies-including wind
turbines, electric vehicles, photovoltaic cells
and fluorescent lighting-use materials at
risk of supply disruptions in the short term.
Those risks will generally decrease in the
medium and long term.
Clean energy technologies currently
constitute about 20 percent of global
consumption of critical materials. As clean
energy technologies are deployed more
widely in the decades ahead, their share
of global consumption of critical materials
will likely grow. Green energy technology
is expected to become the largest
consumer of rare earth elements in the
future. In 2009 China was the world’s top
investor in clean energy technology at over
$34 billion. Since 2005, the country’s wind
generation capacity has increased by more
than 100% a year. The government’s
renewable energy policy aims to procure
15% of the country’s energy from non-
carbon sources by 2020, twice the
proportion of 2005. In 2009, China
became the largest manufacturer of wind
turbines in the world, with 17 of its 40
turbine manufacturers being state-owned,
12 private Chinese firms, and 11 joint
ventures or foreign owned (The Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2010).
The country has doubled its installed
wind power capacity every year since
2006 and is now the world’s largest
producer of wind turbine. By 2020, China
is expected to boost its wind power
capacity to 100 Giga watts (GW) or more,
up from 12 GW in 2008. The annual
growth rate will be about 20 percent
(China Daily, 2009). Similarly, the Global
Wind Energy Council (GWEC) forecasts
that the global installed wind capacity in
2011 will climb to 409 GW, up from
158.5 GW at the end of 2009. The
additional 250.5 GW will require
167,000 tonnes of REMs. China has
announced that in the next ten years it
will “construct some 133 giga watts of
wind turbine generated electricity.”
Around two tonnes of neodymium is
needed for each wind turbine and NdFeB
magnets are a critical component for some
models of the new generation wind-
powered turbines.
Hydrogen-fuel based cars, for
example, require platinum-based
catalysts; electric-hybrid cars need lithium
batteries; and rhenium super alloys are
an indispensable input for modern
aircraft production. In 2009, China
produced 19,000 tonnes of rare earth
hydrogen storage materials. They
consumed 7,900 tonnes of rare earth,
accounting for 11% of the total rare earth
consumption. Since November 2009,
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China has become the largest auto market
in the world. China’s automobile industry
has been in rapid development since the
early 1990s. In 2009, China produced
13.79 million units of automobile. The
Chinese are also investing big in electric
cars, hybrid cars and the underlying
industry. The Chinese are already one of
the largest producers of lithium-ion
batteries and as the main application in
car batteries; lithium-ion demand is
growing fast. Rare earth hydrogen storage
materials are major raw materials for the
production of nickel-hydrogen battery. As
nickel-hydrogen battery shows positive
development prospects in the electric tool
and electric vehicle sectors, it is forecast
that China’s hybrid electric vehicle market
will acquire explosive growth after 2010
and the annual growth rate will reach
12% (China Research and Intelligence,
2010).
According to Reuters, global sales of
hybrid electric cars are forecast to reach 3
million units in 2015 with a total REM
requirement of 33,000 tonnes. One of the
largest growth areas is expected to be the
production of hybrid vehicles, such as the
Toyota Prius. Each hybrid car contains
16 kg of rare earths, predominantly in its
batteries and electric motors. It is
estimated that the motor in the average
Prius hybrid uses about 193 grams, or
about 7 ounces, of neodymium and 24
grams of dysprosium, while the fully
electric Nissan Leaf uses about 421 grams
of neodymium and 56 grams of
dysprosium.
The Chinese government, determined
to become a world leader in green
technology, and plans to invest billions
of dollars over the next few years to
develop electric and hybrid vehicles. A
group of 16 big state-owned companies
had already agreed to form an alliance to
do research and development, and creates
standards for electric and hybrid vehicles.
The plan aims to put more than a million
electric and hybrid vehicles on the road
over the next few years in what is already
the world’s biggest and fastest growing
auto market. The announcement, analysts
say, is another example of how China
seeks to marshal resources and tackle
industries and new markets. The plan also
underlines what China describes as its
growing commitment to combating
pollution and reducing carbon emissions.
The Chinese government announced
it will spend $14.7 billion through 2020
on alternative drive train vehicles, with
the bulk of the money going towards all-
electric vehicles. Pike Research, projects
that between 2010 and 2015, China will
have 1.85 million hybrids and EVs sold,
with 1 million EVs on the road. In the
U.S. more than 2.3 million hybrids will
be sold during that time, and 840,000
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plug-in and all-electric vehicles. At the
2010 Beijing Motor Show, more than 20
electric vehicles were on display, most of
which came from native automakers. As
of May 2010, at least 10 all-electric
models have been reported to be on track
for volume-production. The first mass
produced plug-in hybrid car (BYD
F3DM), all-electric minivan (Luxgen 7
MPV EV) and all-electric long-range bus
(500 km range Zonda Bus) are Chinese
(Gartner John , 2010).
Many of the rare earth metals are also
used in sectors such as semi-conductors.
The semiconductor industry is dominated
by Chinese Taipei, South Korea, United
States, and Japan. The role of the semi-
conductor industry is one of a technology
enabler: the semiconductor industry is
widely recognized as a key driver
for economic growth throughout the
electronics value chain. The semiconductor
market represented USD213 billion in
2004 and the industry was one enabling
factor in the generation of USD1200 billion
in electronic systems business and USD
5000 billion in services, representing close
to 10% of world GDP that year. The semi-
conductor industry is also a high-growth
industry, experiencing 13% growth on
average per annum over the last 20 years
(Korinek, J. and J. Kim, 2010).
Table 10: Annual sales of Toyota prius worldwide and by region (in thousands)





2000 19.0 12.5 5.8 5.6 0.7 0.01
2001 29.5 11.0 16.0 15.6 2.3 0.2
2002 28.1 6.7 20.3 20.1 0.8 0.2
2003 43.2 17.0 24.9 24.6 0.9 0.4
2004 125.7 59.8 55.9 54.0 8.1 1.9
2005 175.2 43.7 109.9 107.9 18.8 2.9
2006 185.6 48.6 109.0 107.0 22.8 5.3
2007 281.3 58.3 183.8 181.2 32.2 7.0
2008 285.7 73.1 163.3 158.6 41.5 7.7
2009 404.2 208.9 144.3 139.7 42.6 8.4
Jan-Sept2010 401.3 254.2 105.9 103.3 35.5 5.8
Total 2,011 826.9 939.1 917.5 206.1 39.7
Source: Toyota Corporation
RARE EARTH ELEMENTS IN CHINA: GROWTH, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS
27
There are numerous examples that
point to China’s anticipated increase in
rare earth consumption. For example, at
the end of July 2008, China had 600
million cell phone users. Less than one
year later, by the end of March 2009,
China had 670 million cell phone users
(Xinhuanet, 2009). China’s mobile phone
industry has high growth rate, raising its
share on the global mobile phone market.
During 2007, 600 million mobile phones
were made in China which accounted for
over 50% of the global production. The
domestic sales of cell phone made a
breakthrough of 100 million in China in
2006. In 2007, the domestic sales of cell
phone in china were 190 million,
increased by 74%. For year of 2007, sales
volume had reached about 23 billion USD,
increased by 17% as compared with 2006.
The export volume of China’s cell phones
added up to a record high of 385 million
in 2006, increased by 69.3% as compared
with 2005. In 2007, this figure reached
483 million, increased by 125.45% as
compared with 2006. As far as 2006, the
export volume had reached 31.214 billion
USD, increased by 52.47% as compared
with 2005. The export volume of 2007
was 35.6 billion dollars, increased by
114.01% as compared with 2006 (Pr-
inside, 2008).
The rare earth metals are critical for
the production of smart bombs, laser
targeting systems in tanks, and silent
technology used in helicopter blades. The
rare earth metals of most concern to the
military and the Defense Department are
neodymium, samarium, and yttrium.
Neodymium is an essential metal in a
magnetic alloy which was developed
separately by General Motors in Detroit
and Sumitomo Special Metals Co. in
Japan in the 1980s. Now it is used in
speaker magnets, disk drives, motors,
and, more importantly, in missile weapons
systems like the Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM). Neodymium is also
used in magnets for hybrid-electric
motors being developed to cut fuel use in
U.S. Navy destroyers. Samarium is needed
for magnets being used by Lockheed
Martin Corp.’s SPY-1 radar systems on
Aegis destroyers. China is the only
supplier in the world for yttrium which is
needed for the laser gun sights in the
General Dynamics Abrams tank (RC Zar,
2010).
The DDG-51 Hybrid Electric Drive
Ship Program uses neodymium iron
boron magnets which help power the
guided destroyers. Night vision goggles
and rangefinder equipment use rubidium
to increase accuracy and visibility. The
Aegis Spy-1 Radar uses the samarium
cobalt magnet to withstand stresses as it
has the highest temperature rating of any
rare earth magnet. Even with a threefold
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increase in REE demand over the past ten
years, demand is expected to increase even
further, by anywhere from 8 to 790
percent over the next five years (Kientz
R, 2010).
Rare earth elements are needed for
China’s expansion of its own military
needs (aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and ballistic missiles).
Home-grown production needs will
further cut exports already reduced to
crippling levels. Not surprisingly, these
measures have raised real concerns outside
of China regarding the future availability
of the refined products created from
REMs. The rare earth supply chain for the
sleep paralyzed Western defense industries
is now being held hostage by the Chinese
who want to keep the rare earth metals
for their own rapidly expanding markets.
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T he growing number ofapplications for rare earths,
coupled with the burgeoning demand for
clean energy and the latest consumer
technologies has raised the threat of
an acute shortage in rare earths, as
production has struggled to keep up.
Many of the world’s experts foresee a
supply deficit of REO by 2014 as demand
over time is expected to exceed the
industry’s ability to produce and as
commercial stocks are depleted. While
new or reopened mines outside of china
are expected to increase global production,
resulting in an over all surplus, shortfalls
are expected in certain elements,
particularly in Neodymium and
Europium, and the heavy rare earths
Terbium, Dysprosium, and Yttrium.
Demand for rare-earth metals is likely to
increase between 10 percent and 20
percent each year, analysts say, thanks to
growing demand for elements like
neodymium, which is used in making
hybrid electric vehicles and generators for
wind turbines.
4.  GLOBAL DEMAND-
SUPPLY INTERFACE BY 2014
Source: Roskill, IMCOA, CREIC, Neo Materials Technology
Figure 7: World supply/demand balance for rare earths, 2004-2014 (t REO)
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World demand for rare earth elements
are estimated at 134,000 tonnes per year,
with global production around 124,000
tonnes annually. The difference is covered
by above-ground stocks or inventories.
World demand is projected to rise to
180,000 tonnes annually by 2012, while
it is unlikely that new mine output will
close the gap in the short term. By 2014,
global demand for rare earth elements
may exceed 200,000 tonnes per year.
China’s output may reach 160,000
tonnes per year (up from 130,000 tonnes
in 2008) in 2014 (Marc Humphries,
2010). An additional capacity shortfall of
40,000 tonnes per year may occur. New
production from ROW could meet
increased demand to 2014-but will the
“balance” be right? This brings spotlight
on the absolute necessity for other
countries get to full-scale rare earth
production sufficient to meet global
demand and to deploy a complete mining-
to-magnets manufacturing supply chain
as soon as possible outside China.
The above table shows that the global
demand REO in 2014 will be around
180-190,000t a little less than the global
supply of 190-210,000t. However some
individual oxides will be in short of
supply particularly the heavy rare earths
like Terbium, Dysprosium and Yttrium,
their proportion to the total demand is
comparatively less, although their
importance to some the applications are
very important. Since supply of these
elements is going to be so tight, the prices
for Tb, Dy and Y will remain strong.
Neodymium iron boron permanent
magnet is the leading product among rare
earth magnetic materials. With the
development of new application areas, it
is forecast that the global neodymium
iron boron industry will maintain the
growth rate of 15% in the coming five
years, whereas Chinese neodymium iron
Table 11: Forecast supply and demand for selected rare earths in 2014
Rare Earth Oxide Demand @ % Supply @ %
tpa REO tpa REO
Lanthanum 50-55000t 28.4% 52-57000t 26.9%
Cerium 60-65000t 36.5% 80-85000t 40.2%
Neodymium 34900t 19.4% 33000t 16.3%
Terbium 400-500t 0.3% 400-500t 0.2%
Dysprosium 1900-2300t 1.1% 1800-2000t 0.9%
Yttrium 10-14000t 6.7% 9-13000t 5.7%
Total 180-190,000t 100% 190-210,000t 100%
IMCOA, 2009
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boron industry will maintain the growth
rate of 20% and the global demand for
Neodymium will outstrip the global
supply with a thousand tonnes marginal
difference in 2014.
The rare earth content of NdFeB
magnets varies by manufacturer and
application. An electric drive vehicle may
use up to a kilogram (kg) of Nd, while
each wind turbine may contain several
hundred kilograms. Rare earth PMs may
also incorporate praseodymium (Pr),
which can be substituted for or combined
with Nd. Dysprosium (Dy) or terbium
(Tb) may also be added to the inter
metallic alloy to increase the temperature
at which the magnet can operate before
losing its magnetic. The cumulative
demand for Nd and other REEs in these
clean energy technologies is a function of
both the material content per individual
product and the total number of products
sold. Therefore, aggressive technology
penetration rates envisioned under many
worldwide clean energy strategies could
significantly increase global demand for
Nd, Pr, Dy and Tb (London I.M. 2010).
Chinese economy will continue to
grow or near double digit rates for the
foreseeable future and disposable income
for automobiles, personal electronics, etc
driving significant internal RE demand.
China is already the largest auto market
and will produce 500,000 electric vehicles
in 2011 and, leads in wind power
generation. So to meet this increasing
demand for REEs, China has employed a
number of controls to date such as,
production limits, export quotas, export
tariffs, stockpiling, closing of separation
plants and even literally blowing up illegal
mines (REITA, 2011).
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T he section examines the tradein rare earths and importance
and Chinese export restrictions. Rare
earths were traded freely and at a
discounted price on the global market
before the mid-2000s. Since 2005,
however, China-the world’s leading RE
producer- gradually tightened export
restrictions on rare earth oxide
(REO).China has become the largest
country of rare-earth deposits, producer,
consumer and exporter and, there is a
growing demand-supply gap because of
a dearth of any other major supplying
nation. China’s imposition of export
quotas on several rare earth metals, on
the grounds that it needs the higher
quantities for its clean energy and high-
tech sectors, is squeezing an already
starved market. China wants rare-earths
companies to add value by making more
technologically advanced products rather
than exporting the raw material. While it
has cut foreign sale quotas of the minerals,
there are no restrictions on exports of
finished products.
Figure 8, shows the gross volume in
tonnes of exports of REEs which grew
from 6500 tonnes in 1990 to 57,400
tonnes in 2006 and declined to 49,000
tones in 2007, and 42,000 tonnes in
2008, respectively. It indicates that the
5.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
RARE EARTH ELEMENTS
Source: Reitausa.org, 2010
Figure 8: Gross volume of exports from 1979 to 2008
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gross volume of exports had been in a
growth trend until 2006, and then
declined in 2007 and 2008 mainly
because of the global financial crisis which
had very badly affected the major rare
earth consuming countries such as U.S,
Japan and Europe. Although, China
began to control exports of rare earth
products with quota administration since
1999, the total exports did not decrease
generally, until 2007 except a decline in
2001.
Figure 9, explains the gross value of
exports in million U.S dollar from 1990
to 2008. The total exports in value terms
also grew outstandingly, reaching to peak
level at about, USD 1.2 billion, in 2007,
while the export value was just 80 million
in 1990. From 1998 to 2005, the annual
average of gross value for exports was
about USD 420 million, and the annual
average of gross volume for exports was
about 46,946.63 tonnes, namely 8.98
USD/Kg. In 2007, the price was about
24 USD/Kg, which exuberantly increased
in the last months of 2010 to USD 60/
kg, and above.
Rare earth prices remained static for
decades due to plentiful supplies, lulling
the high-tech industry into a false sense
of security. After Beijing cut export quotas
by 70 percent for the second half of
2010, prices of some rare earths has gone
up, as much as 850 percent. Due to the
extensive management of rare earth
resource exploitation and scattered
distribution of the rare earth industry,
many foreign importers used the
opportunity to force down the price. When
the global demand for rare earth materials
increases year by year, China exported
6,100 tonnes of medium-end and low-end
rare earth products in 1990; the average
price was 13,600 USD/ton. In 2009,
China exported 36,100 tonnes of rare
earth smelting and separation products,
Source: Reitausa.org, 2010
Figure 9: Gross value of exports from 1979 to 2008
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rising by 16.67% YOY. The export value
amounted to USD 310 million and the
average price was only 8,959 USD/ton
(China Research and Intelligence, 2010).
Low prices for rare earth elements from
China, contributed to cuts at the
Mountain Pass mine in the United States,
one of the main source of supply for many
years, before it closed in 2002. They also
discouraged most entrants to the industry
until the last two years, when prices began
to climb because of strong demand.
The data from UNComtrade data base
shows that in 2009, a total of 43 countries
reported exports of rare earths. The entire
exports were valued at 427.75 million
US$ and 61232.32 tonnes of rare earths
were exported by the 43 countries. The
details of the top ten exporting countries
by volume in tonnes and value in million
US$ in 2009 have shown in table 13.
China including Hong Kong and Macao
exported about 39 thousand tonnes with
a share of more than 64 percent in 2009
followed by Japan exported 5904 tonnes
with a share of 9.64 percent and Russia
exported around 4619 tonnes in 2009.
Estonia and U.S were in the fourth and
fifth position respectively in terms export
volumes. Analysis of exports in value
terms shows that China including Hong
Kong and Macao accounted for slightly
more than 50% of the share of rare earths
exports by value. China was followed by
Japan with a share of around 23% and
Germany with a share of around 5%.
China therefore continued to be the
dominant exporter of rare earths both in
terms of volume and by value and China
for all purposes continues to be an
Table 12: Top ten exporters of rare earths by volume and value in 2009 (Million US$)
R e p o r t e r Exp Qty % Share by C o u n t r y E x p o r t % Exports
( To n n e s )  Qty Tonnes  Value  by Value
China+HK+Macao 39201.67 64.02 China+HK+Macao 240.97 50.97
Japan 5904.61 9.64 Japan 107.35 22.71
Russia Federation 4619.61 7.54 Germany 22.44 4.75
Estonia 2678.85 4.37 USA 15.36 3.25
USA 1332.50 2.18 France 14.02 2.96
France 1246.13 2.04 Norway 13.64 2.89
Austria 2578.62 4.21 Italy 11.80 2.50
Kazakhstan 1053.32 1.72 Estonia 10.38 2.20
Germany 657.55 1.07 Russia Federation 9.92 2.10
United Kingdom 555.85 0.91 United Kingdom 6.62 1.40
Source: UN Comtrade data base
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effective monopolistic supplier of rare
earths.
The details of the top ten importing
countries by quantity and value in million
US$ in 2009 are placed at table 13. In 2009
a total quantity of 69638.07 tonnes of rare
earths were imported by a total of 91
countries. United Sates was the top
importers of rare earths in terms of quantity
with Japan and Germany occupying second
and third positions. United Sates accounted
for 23.57% of the world’s share of rare earth
imports by quantity which was equal to
16416 tonnes. Japan imported 13490
tonnes and accounted 19.37 percent of the
total imports. Germany imported 8000
tonnes followed by France importing 6985
tonnes. The entire imports were valued at
608.48 million US$ 69638.07 tonnes of
rare earths were imported by the 91
countries. Japan was the largest importer
of rare earths in 2009 by value terms,
followed by USA, Thailand and Germany
respectively. Japan accounted for 25% of the
world’s rare earth imports.
The difference in quantity between
total rare earths exported and imported
amounts to 8405 tonnes. This difference
is very large and cannot be explained
away as statistical error. One possible
reason could be the belief that rare earths
are smuggled from China. Illicit exports
are typically in the form of REE mixed
with steel and exported as steel
composites. The process is reversed in the
country recovering the REE’s (British
Geological Survey, 2010).  In case the
smuggled REE’s are accounted for at the
receiving country either deliberately or
inadvertently, then some portion of this
discrepancy of around 8000 tonnes could
be partially explained.
Table 13: Top ten importers of rare earths by quantity and by value in 2009
Reporter Trade Qty % Imports Reporter Value US $ % Imports
Tonnes  Qty  Million by Value
USA 16416.371 23.57 Japan 152.12 25.00
Japan 13490.908 19.37 USA 115.03 18.90
Germany 8218.155 11.80 Thailand 67.51 11.09
France 6985.406 10.03 Germany 51.76 8.51
Austria 4456.6 6.40 France 40.57 6.67
Estonia 4124.822 5.92 China+HK 38.19 6.28
China+HK 4039.644 5.80 S. Korea 24.90 4.09
S. Korea 2632.811 3.78 Austria 21.62 3.55
Brazil 1314.483 1.89 Malaysia 11.29 1.86
Russia 1195.176 1.72 Italy 10.00 1.64
Source: UN Comtrade data base
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5.1 China’s Exports and Imports
In 2009, China exported a total of
38573.02 tonnes but the total of all the
rare earths exported to 46 countries added
up to 40982.13 tonnes. The quantity and
the percentage share of the top 10
customers of China is indicated in the
below table. United States was the largest
importer of Chinese rare earths by
quantity and imported around 14700
tonnes of rare earths, these accounted for
38% of the Chinese exports. Japan
imported around 10500 tonnes and its
share amounted to 27%. North America
(mainly the United States) and Asia each
account for around 36% of the Chinese
rare earth exports by quantity. Around
24% is exported to Europe.
China’s exports were valued at
239.37 million US$ in 2009. The details
of the top ten customers of China in
million US$ in 2009 are depicted in table
15. The largest importer of rare earths
from China was Japan with around 76
million US $, followed by the United Sates
with around 67 million US$. Japan and
the United Sates accounted for nearly 61%
of the exports of rare earths from China.
About 30% of the exports are accounted
by Hong Kong, France, Germany, South
Korea and Netherlands.
5.2 Rare Earth Export Control by
China
Several objectives motivate
implementing export restrictions on
strategic raw materials. In some cases,
these can be understood as a response to
market imperfections. The question
remains, however, whether export
Table 14: China’s top 10 customers by quantity and value in 2009
Partner Qty in % Partner Trade Value %
Tonnes Share million US$  Share
USA 14764.6 38.28 Japan 76.66 32.29
Japan 10519.71 27.27 USA 67.48 28.43
France 4391.593 11.39 Hong Kong 21.75 9.16
Hong Kong 2658.938 6.89 France 20.45 8.61
Italy 1509.58 3.91 Germany 15.58 6.56
Austria 1465.062 3.80 Rep. of Korea 8.40 3.54
Germany 1034.877 2.68 Netherlands 7.60 3.20
Australia 979.646 2.54 Italy 5.51 2.32
U.K 594.76 1.54 U.Kingdom 2.67 1.12
Netherlands 494.23 1.28 Other Asia 2.65 1.12
Source: UN Comtrade data base
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restrictions are the most effective tool to
achieve the desired outcomes. As many
of these raw materials are produced in a
limited number of countries, export
restrictions that are imposed in one
country may motivate other countries to
follow if importers massively move to buy
their raw materials. The restrictions
imposed by the first country then lose their
effectiveness. This can in principle lead
to a situation of competitive policy
practices – and of higher and higher export
taxes.
Many export restrictions are put into
place for environmental reasons or to
preserve natural resources. In other cases,
export restrictions are imposed in order
to encourage supply of raw materials to
domestic producers of downstream semi-
processed goods. On 23rd September
2010, exports of rare earth elements
(REEs) from China to Japan apparently
stopped due to a dispute over maritime
boundaries. This use of economic leverage
to influence policy raised concerns about
the impact of China’s strategic hold on
these precious metals. REEs have long
been considered the “enhancers” of global
products and are used to manufacture
defense and commercial high-technology
items. Their availability today, however,
could be jeopardized since China controls
over 97 percent of their production and
refinement (CSIS, 2010).
Until recently, the global dependency
on China for rare earths was a well-kept
secret. But word started to spread fast
after Beijing cut export quotas by 70 per
cent for the second half of 2010, sending
prices of some oxides - the purified form
of rare earth elements - up as much as
850 per cent. The need for alternative
supplies from outside China suddenly
became obvious. The Chinese dominance
has raised concerns within industry
regarding prices and lead times for critical
defense hardware. With demand
increasing, the problem of purchasing and
shipping REEs for products is
concurrently growing.
In the first week of July 2010, China
announced a number of changes affecting
the rare earths sector. These changes
included a reduction in the total amount
of rare earths that may be exported from
China besides other measures (Gareth P
Hatch, 2010). China has passed the
“2009-2015 Rare Earth Industry
Development Plan”. According to the
document, in the next six years, no new
rare earth mining permit will be
approved. The separation of newly formed
rare earth smelting companies will be
strictly reviewed. China has officially cited
environmental issues as one of the key
factors for its recent regulation on the
industry, but non-environmental motives
have also been imputed to China’s rare
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earth policy. According to The Economist,
“Slashing their exports of rare-earth
metals...is all about moving Chinese
manufacturers up the supply chain, so
they can sell valuable finished goods to
the world rather than lowly raw materials”
(The Economist, 2010). Foreign
companies also taking part in this
business of value additions. One possible
example is the division of General Motors
which deals with miniaturized magnet
research, which shut down its US office
and moved its entire staff to China in
2006. A news release in December 2010
announced that one Japanese company
had moved its magnet-producing industry
to China to take advantage of cheaper
prices and more certain supplies. This is
what the Chinese are trying to do; it’s just
good business.
5.3 Chinese Rare Earth Export
Quotas
China practices the quota license
administration on the export of rare earth
products since 1998 citing the need for
environmental management and resource
conservation. In recent years, Chinese
government cuts down the volume of
export enterprises, export quotas and
annual exploitation volume of rare earth
ores. The Beijing government argues that
its curbs are for environmental reasons
and to guarantee supplies to Chinese
clean-energy firms it is trying to promote
internationally. But it has also said its
dominance as a producer should give it
more control over global prices. China’s
Commerce Ministry allotted 14,446
tonnes of quotas to 31 companies, which
was 11.4 percent less than the 16,304
tonnes it allocated to 22 companies in the
first half of 2010 quotas a year ago. While
industrial users of the minerals in
industrialized countries face tighter
supplies and higher prices, China’s export
curbs have created opportunities to open
mines or revive dormant production in
Canada, Australia and the United States.
China cut its export quotas for rare earths
by 35 percent in the first round of permits
for 2011, threatening to extend a global
shortage of the minerals needed for smart
phones, hybrid cars and guided missiles.
Export quotas have been falling
continuously since 2005. The plan to
restrict rare earth exports were reportedly
commenced in 2005-06.The aim was to
restrict rare earth production in China to
around 80000 tonnes (People’s Daily,
2009). But the decline between 2008 and
2009 was quite drastic. There is wide-scale
concern that China may soon restrict or
even ban the export of particular rare
earths. There has been much speculation
about China’s future policy on rare earths.
However it is quite clear that China has
been systematically and methodically
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reducing quotas (Kara Hudai et all,
2010).
In 2010, it cuts down the export
quota to 30,258 tonnes, including 22,512
tonnes for domestic enterprises and 7,746
tonnes for foreign enterprises. The data
shows that the export quotas for 2010
have been reduced by 40% compared with
2009. This is a far greater reduction than
forecast that the reductions would be of
the order of 6-7% in the coming years.
The impact of the change will have far
reaching consequences, particularly
outside of China. Chinese rare earth
export quotas for 2010 are now
significantly less than rest of the world
(ROW) consumption having a gap of
18,000 tonnes. The quota for 2010 was
30,258t REO compared with ROW
demand of 50000t. Total ROW
production capacity is currently
10-12,000t at best, which indicates a
shortfall of 10-15,000 t at least in 2010.
China announced in December 2010 that
it will cut its export quotas for rare-earth
minerals by more than 11 percent in the
first half of 2011, further shrinking
supplies of metals needed to make a range
of high-tech products. The move comes
on the heels of a 40 percent slash in the
export quota on such minerals in 2010.
The export restraints have inflamed trade
ties with the United States, European
Union and Japan in particular (Tom Miles,
2011).
But a further reduction in quotas for
2011 issued late 2010 would be
consistent with recent Chinese policy. The
Chinese government typically makes a
main allocation of quotas near the end of
the year, followed by a smaller,
supplemental allocation in the summer.
But the supplemental allocation issued
last July was down 72 percent from a year
earlier, as Chinese officials called for
making sure that their own industries
Table 15: Chinese export quota and demand from rest of the world (ROW):
2005–2010. (tonnes REO)
Year Domestic Fore ign Total Change R O W
Companies Companies Demand
2005 48,048t 17,657t 65,609t   - 46,000t
2006 45,752t 16,069t 61,821t -6% 50,000t
2007 43574t 16,069t 59,643t -4% 50,000t
2008 40,987t 15,834t 56,939t -5.5% 50,000t
2009 33,300t 16845t 50,145t -12% 25,000t
2010 16304t for 5978t for 30,258t -40% 48,000t
1st half  1st half  2010
Sources: Kingsnorth, 2010, Hatch 2010
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had ample supplies and that heavily
polluting illegal mines should be closed.
According to the revised “2009 to 2015
Development Plan of the Rare Earth
Industry” prepared by the MIIT, the
annual REO export level from China will
be restricted below 35 kt between 2009
and 2015. If the aforementioned targets
can be strictly enforced, the existing
stockpiles outside China are expected to
be exhausted over time, which will further
strengthen China’s competitiveness. With
the current quota system, China does not
distinguish between the individual rare
earth oxides but limits the total tonnage
of exports across the board. That has led
to Chinese companies exporting as much
as possible of the high-value heavy rare
earths like dysprosium, instead of low-
value light rare earths like cerium.
5.4 Other Export Restrictions
Export restrictions are applied to
many of the rare earth metals originating
from China. Export restrictions come
in a variety of forms. They include
quantitative restrictions (quotas), export
taxes, duties and charges and mandatory
minimum export prices. In so far as they
can affect export volumes, the reduction
of VAT rebates as well as stringent export
licensing requirements may also be
considered forms of export restrictions. As
discussed before China has announced
several cuts in export quotas of rare earth
metals and raised export taxes to as high
as 25 percent, from zero to 15
percent previously (IER , 2011).
Export Taxes on Rare Earth Exports
from China
In late 2006, the Chinese government
introduced a tax on rare earth exports of
10%, which was increased to 15% on
selected rare earths in 2007. Effective from
1 January 2008, export taxes were raised
to the following levels
China has added a 15- to 25-percent
export duty on rare earth exports and
41 rare earth products have been listed
in the category of prohibited processing
trade. Rare earth exporters, including
Table 16: Chinese export taxes on rare earths
Materials Tax (%)
Europium, terbium, dysprosium, yttrium as oxides,
carbonates or chlorides 25%
All other rare earth oxides, carbonates and chlorides 15%
Neodymium metal 15%
All other rare earth metals 25%
Ferro rare earth alloys 20%
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10 foreign companies, are facing stricter
supervision on their qualification. The
move is an increase from the 15 percent
temporary export tax on neodymium,
used in batteries for hybrid cars including
Toyota Motor Corp.’s Prius. Lanthanum,
also used in hybrids, and cerium, used
for polishing semiconductors, were not
taxed in 2010, and will be taxed at 25
percent in 2011, the Chinese ministry
reported in December 2010. China’s
export tax for dysprosium will be kept at
25 percent next year, and the same with
terbium, according to the statement of
China’s finance ministry.
In 2007, China withdrew the refund
of VAT (16%) on exports of unimproved
rare earths, while the refund on higher
value-added exports such as magnets
and phosphors remains in place. The
effect of this decision, combined with the
export tax regime above, is that non-
Chinese rare earth processors such as
cerium polishing powder producers and
rare earth magnet producers pay 31%
more for rare earth raw materials (plus
transport and storage costs) than their
Chinese counterparts.
In other cases, export restrictions are
imposed in order to encourage supply of
raw materials to domestic producers of
downstream semi-processed goods. In
the years prior to the 2008 downturn
Chinese exports of rare earth compounds
were declining while exports of metals
and alloys were increasing slightly.
In 2008 and 2009, China began
implementing regulations to place greater
controls on the rare earth industry. For
example, the Ministry of Land and
Resources implemented a regulation in
2009 that would “protect and make
rational use of China’s superior natural
resources,” in particular, tungsten,
antimony, and rare earth ores. According
to the regulation, the Ministry of Land
and Resources is suspending any
applications nationwide for survey or
mining licenses for rare earth ores. The
goal for controlling the rare earth industry
in China is “to prevent over-exploitation
and blind competition, and to advance
the effective protection and scientific,
rational use of these superior mineral
resources.” The Chinese argue that the
REM industry is unsustainable and is rife
with environmental externalities that
ultimately take a toll on the public. They
maintain that export restrictions are in
place to reflect the true price of REMs and
their ecological costs, while protecting the
environment from overexploitation and
illegal mining operations (ICTSD, 2010).
Most of the analysts argue that, if China
causes a shortage of rare earths, it will be
a temporary shortage, since the rising
prices for rare earth elements will serve
as an incentive for others to enter the
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market, leading to greater supply. The
United States, for example, has 13
percent of known rare earth reserves and
could get back into the production and
refining business. Still, there will be a
lag before new production becomes
available, and it could easily come from
an equally troubling source. After China,
Russia has the next largest reserves (19
percent), and it is at least as likely (if
not more so) to play games with export
restrictions, and have more lax safety
and environmental standards as well
(New York Times, 2010). Countries that
rely on Rare Earth Metals (REMs) for
manufacturing are lashing out at China
after Beijing officially announced a
further 35 percent reduction in export
quotas. The cut, which will affect exports
for the first half of 2011, follows a 72
percent reduction in REM exports in the
second half of 2010.
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D espite the rising demand and thehistorical high prices reached by
many commodities, mine capacity
expansions and new mine production
capacity have not kept pace. Overall, the
price of minerals is driven by multiple
physical, financial and political factors.
When deciphering price data and trends,
it is helpful to know whether there is a
market surplus or deficit and the extent
of the imbalance. Physical parameters
(e.g., stock changes, closures of old mines
and the start-up of new ones) are in turn
influenced by general economic conditions
and financial forecasts (e.g., inflation and
exchange rates) that inform investor
sentiments. Unanticipated shocks- such
as monopolistic or oligopolistic pricing
(e.g., export quotas); geopolitics and
natural disasters- also play a role in
affecting physical and financial
parameters.
6.1 Negotiated Pricing and Metal
Exchanges
Most rare, precious, minor and specialty
metals and their alloys are traded through
bilateral contracts based on negotiated
pricing between parties. The fragmented
nature of some of these markets and the
remoteness of some producers has resulted
in traders playing a dominant role.
Regionally, traders account for a large part
of the specialty metal supply coming out
of regions such as China, the former Soviet
Union and Africa. The nature of the
process limits price disclosure in these
markets and the prices of specialty metals
quoted by traders and consultants vary
widely in their reliability (U.S Department
of Energy, 2010). To understand the price
behavior and volatility of key materials,
it is also important to examine the ways
in which these commodities are bought
and sold, in conjunction with whether
they are produced as a co- or byproduct
of other specialty metals (e.g., REEs) or a
by-product of a major metal. Both aspects
influence the price behavior and volatility
of a mineral. The influences of these
factors can be gleaned from a comparison
between the historical price trends of
commodities produced as a byproduct of
metals traded on major exchanges and
6.  REE PRICING AND
PRICE MOVEMENTS
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commodities mainly transacted through
bi-lateral contracts.
For now, the demand/supply equation
has been wildly swayed, and prices have
rocketed. It has been widely reported that
the Chinese authorities plan to implement
a ‘fully unified pricing mechanism’ in order
to control the price of rare earths
throughout the country. On closer
inspection, the proposed mechanism
seems to apply only to the Fujian,
Guangdong, Hunan and Jiangxi
provinces, and the Guangxi autonomous
region, at this time. These five
jurisdictions are adjacent to one another
in the southeast of China, an area whose
elution deposited/ ion-absorbed clays are
rich in the heavy rare earth elements.
Inner Mongolia and other northern
jurisdictions, which predominantly
produce light rare earths, do not appear
to be covered by the announcement. It
would thus appear that the change is an
attempt by the authorities to specifically
control the prices of the more valuable
heavy rare earths (Gareth P Hatch,
2010). Some would argue that China is
already well in control of rare earth pricing
with more than 90 percent market share,
Chinese firms already control prices.
Are the Chinese looking to actively
manipulate the price of rare earths? To
assume that ‘the Chinese’, in some unified
conspiracy, are working to throttle back
rare earth supply and raise prices would
be incorrect and there are certainly some
Chinese rare earth companies that
recognize they will get the best pricing for
material outside China, and would love
to use their expertise to help establish
operations outside China. This would
allow these Chinese companies to more
directly reap the benefit of worldwide
demand. Problems associated with future
pricing of rare earths will affect different
parts of the supply chain differently.
Supply risks, at least in the short-to-
medium term, are less associated with the
prospect of increasing prices because
in most cases the cost of these elements
is a small part of the final product
manufacturing cost. However, in the last
6-12 months the price of many rare earth
elements has increased by approximately
Table 17: Purchase option and source of price information for REEs
Minerals Purchase option Source of price info
Rare Earth
Elements
Negotiated purchase, not traded on metal
exchanges and therefore no spot market;
however, illegally traded REEs are sold through
less formal channels and may possibly be sold
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300-700%, which in some cases has had
a more significant impact on the price of
the final product.
6.2 Rare Earths Price Movements
Rare earth prices remained static for
decades due to plentiful supplies, lulling
the high-tech industry into a false sense of
security. After Beijing cut export quotas
by 70 percent for the second half of 2010,
prices of some rare earths gone up as much
as 850 percent. When the global demand
for rare earth materials increases year by
year, China exported 6,100 tonnes of
medium-end and low-end rare earth
products in 1990; the average price was
13,600 USD/ton. In 2009, China exported
36,100 tonnes of rare earth smelting and
separation products, rising by 16.67%
YOY. The export value amounted to USD
310 million and the average price was only
8,959 USD/ton (China Research and
Intelligence, 2010:3). Low prices for rare
earth elements from China contributed to
cuts at the Mountain Pass mine in U.S one
of the main source of supply for many years
before it closed in 2002. They also
discouraged most entrants to the industry
until the last two years, when prices began
to climb because of strong demand.
2008 marked the peak in China’s rare
earth industry. However, in 2009, due to
the economic downturn, demand fell
sharply. Prices fell due to oversupply on the
international market and price wars among
Chinese suppliers, in particular smaller
players. Since 2005, the Chinese
government has been imposing export
quotas on many of the rare earth metals,
resulting in reduced global supply. Higher
prices are a natural result of such supply
restrictions. The latest data reveals that,
China’s exports of rare earth metals burst
through the $100,000-per-tonne mark for
the first time in February 2011, up almost
nine fold from a year before, while the
volume of trade stayed far below historical
averages and each tonne fetched a mere
$14,405 on average. The apparent price
rises have averaged $10,000 per tonne per
month but accelerated in February 2011,
galloping ahead by $34,000 per tonne,
according to Reuters calculations based on
data from China’s Customs office (Tom
Miles, 2011). The explosion in export values
has coincided with a collapse in volumes
coming out of China, the source of almost
the entire world’s rare earth supplies, which
has cut export quotas of the 17 rare earth
metals and raised tariffs on exports.
Figure 10 illustrates the historical
average prices of individual rare earth
oxides between 2001 and 2010. REE
prices have raised threefold overall since
2001. This period covers the 2001
recession, which had lingering effects until
2003, and the 2008– 2009 recession. Two
things to note are that the heavier rare
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earths (e.g., dysprosium, terbium and
europium) are relatively more expensive,
and that prices have risen fairly steadily
since 2003 due to China’s rising domestic
demand and escalating export controls.
The price jumps from 2009–2010 can
perhaps be attributed to a reduction in
China’s rare earth export quota. The export
quota which is for total rare earth exports,
resulted in higher prices for REO exports.
This led to an unexpected fall in China’s
export of LREEs which are generally lower
priced. As a result of the greater scarcity of
light rare earths, the price of LREEs rose
much more than the HREEs. Rare earth
oxide and rare earth metal prices track
closely, with the prices for metals always
higher (though relatively more so for some
rare earth elements than others) (British
Geological Survey, 2010).
After soaring in recent years, rare earth
prices have virtually skyrocketed in 2010.
Cerium, for example, jumped from on
average USD 3.88 per kg in 2009 to USD
50 per kg at beginning of November
2010, while the average price of
lanthanum increased tenfold between
2009 and 2010. Terbium and Europium,
on the other hand, recorded relatively
modest increases of only 7% and 23%.
Unlike the conventional metals, rare
earths are not traded at the exchange. As
a result, pricing is highly obscure, and
there is no way for either producers or
consumers to hedge prices. Neodymium
prices quintupled at the same time to $23
a pound and slumped before almost fully
recovering last quarter of 2010. The price
of neodymium oxide, also used in
magnets in BlackBerrys, has surged more
than four- fold to $88.5 a kilogram from
$19.12 in 2009 because of rising demand
and reduced supply from China, according
to Sydney-based Lynas Corp., which is
building a A$550 million ($542 million)
rare earths mine in Western Australia.
Figure 10: REO prices from 2001–2010
Source: Lynas Corp 2010
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As discussed before the two heavy rare
earths, dysprosium and terbium are in
short supply, mainly because they have
emerged as the miracle ingredients of
green energy products. Tiny quantities of
dysprosium can make magnets in electric
motors lighter by 90 percent, while
terbium can help cut the electricity usage
of lights by 80 percent. According to a
new United States Energy Department
report, the most important of these for
clean energy is dysprosium. Its price is
now $132 a pound compared with $6.50
a pound in 2003. Terbium prices
quadrupled from 2003 to 2008, peaking
at $407 a pound, before slumping in the
global economic crisis to $205 a
pound.
While the long-term price of the light
rare earths remains open for debate, the
quotas will continue to tighten the supply
of heavy rare earths like terbium and
dysprosium, sending prices soaring.
Dysprosium oxide, used in hybrid
vehicles, lasers and nuclear reactors, is
already selling for $284 a kg and that is
projected to rise to over $400 in the next
couple of years, according to Asian Metals.
The rising prices have been a cause for
concern in importing nations, which have
become reliant on affordable REMs from
China. The recent controversy over
Figure 11: Rare earth prices have multiplied over a short period of time.
Source: Lynas Corp, Commerzbank Corporates and markets
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China’s clampdown has prompted prices
such as cerium oxide to climb by 700
percent in less than a year. In light of
China’s virtual monopoly of the REM
market, critics have argued that the
country is simply flexing its economic
muscle.
The figure 12 shows that the prices
dropped continuously as supply from
China increased substantially up to 2000.
The 1992 was the year when Deng
Xiaoping famously stated, “the Middle
East has oil, and China has rare earths”,
since then, China has not only remained
the world’s largest REO producer, but has
also successfully moved its manufacturers
up the supply chain. During this period
rare earth investment at state, provincial
and local levels also increased as china
dominated the market. When the prices
were fallen too short at the international
market, the mountain pass mine in
California the main supplier of REEs till
early 1990s was unable to cope with the
escalating cost and finally shut down its
operation in 2002 also during this decade
the major buyers of rare earths such as
U.S, Japan and Europe switched the
purchase to China.
During 2000 to 2006 prices again went
down; however from 2003, the price started
to increase slightly and it is unlikely to be
seen the prices again at this level. The major
drivers that had an impact on setting the
prices on this period were the high level of
competition within China and handful of
Figure 12: Historic supply, demand and pricing
Source: Lynas Corp, 2010
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powerful buyers in Japan, USA and Europe.
During this period the number of producers
in China reduced from 600 to 150
companies by mergers and acquisition and
there were little regulation from government
side and there were no investment in
environmental compliance within the
Chinese rare earth Industry. This period also
witnessed reducing supply from other
countries along with over all demand
growing from 2003 onwards after
sluggishness in demand from 2000 to
2003.
The figure also shows that from 2003
onwards the prices started to increase again
and there was a steep rise in prices in 2007-
2008 due to changing market conditions
in China. The major drivers of the price
during this time were the temporary crack
down on environmental standards which
resulted in the temporary closure of
multiple producers. Cost increasing in
China due to the start of environmental
compliance, as well labour, energy and
chemical costs increasing and tightening
between demand and supply also
contributed in increasing prices.
In 2009 the price moved down mainly
because of the demand sharply dropped
due to global financial crisis while global
supply almost remained at the same level.
However as the economies started to
Figure13: Future outlook and price drivers
Structural change in industry has commenced
Source: Lynas Corp, 2010
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recover and by the end of 2009 the prices
started to increase again not only because
of the global recovery but a number
internal policies that China adopted
related to rare earth industry. China
started the consolidation of production
and marketing channels that restricted
Chinese supply and demand recovering
strongly after GFC induced the prices to
increase inside China and consequently
increasing the international prices.
The figure 13 shows the future trend
in demand, supply and prices up to 2014.
There would be a number of factors that
affects the price movements both in
Chinese domestic market and
international level. Assuming current
trends continue, new projects are developed
and there is a ‘balance’ in supply and
demand for individual rare earths through
extra supply. The Challenges for 2014 will
be the tight supply and ‘balance’ between
demand supply will still be an issue; so
prices for Tb, Dy and Y will remain strong.
And other issues include, can the rare earths
industry in China be successfully
controlled? And will the first of the new
non-Chinese projects be successfully built
and commissioned?
The impact of Chinese interventions
in the domestic industry such as implicit
assistance to domestic downstream
processors of the targeted products and
thus providing them a competitive
advantage will have an impact on the
prices. China is seeking sustainability and
prices will respond to market demand and
supply from a sustainable base. Estimates
from Chinese government reports shows
that the “Chinese price” for rare earths is
about ¼ of the price that would result from
an environmentally sound, worker friendly,
profitable operation. This means that the
“real” price of rare earths is about four
times higher than the current China price.
An entire set of “green” industries have
grown up over the past ten years in reliance
on that China price. The danger is that as
the China price is phased out, many of these
green industries will prove to be
unprofitable. A primary example of this
risk is the electric car. Since the China price
for rare earths is virtually certain to be
phased out very quickly, this risk is quite
real (Steve Dickinson, 2010). However,
technological change often brings sharp
changes in demand, which, in turn, may
lead to strong price volatility. An example
is the tantalum capacitor industry. Two-
thirds of world tantalum production is used
in electronic components. When the
tantalum price increased sharply in the late
1990s, the electronics industry encouraged
capacitor designers to improve their
niobium capacitors and multiple ceramics
capacitors in order to replace the tantalum
components. The demand for tantalum,
and its price, fell sharply as a result.
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F or China rare earth is the wildcard  now. The Chinese
government has stated that its reserves
of rare earths are finite and, therefore, they
will be developed for the prime benefit of
China’s manufacturing industry. To help
generate manufacturing jobs and move up
the value chain, a series of measures has
been implemented to “conserve resources
and to maximize the benefits” of its rare
earths endowment. With a near monopoly
in REO production, the magnitude of the
projected shortage and its effects on
industrial end users across the globe will
be heavily influenced in the short and
medium term by China’s production and
export policies.
China has officially cited
environmental issues as one of the key
factors for its recent regulation on the
industry, but non-environmental motives
have also been imputed to China’s rare
earth policy. According to The Economist,
“Slashing their exports of rare-earth
metals...is all about moving Chinese
manufacturers up the supply chain, so
they can sell valuable finished goods to
the world rather than lowly raw materials
(The Economist, 2010). Although often
needed only in small quantities, these
metals are increasingly essential to the
development of technologically
sophisticated products. They play a critical
role in the development of innovative
“environmental technologies” to boost
energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. Hydrogen-fuel based cars,
for example, require platinum-based
catalysts; electric-hybrid cars need lithium
batteries; and rhenium super alloys are
an indispensable input for modern
aircraft production. In addition, there are
few substitutes available in the short-term
for these raw materials.
The study finds that, a major
ongoing issue for the rare earths
industry is the balance. Due to the
absurdity between the supply and
demand of individual rare earths, there
always exists a situation in which there
is a shortfall of some rare earths while
others are in surplus. On the basis of
known analyses of major resources it is
considered that some of the ‘heavy’ rare
earths are more likely to be in short
supply in the future.
7.  CONCLUSIONS
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Although production of some
strategic minerals is very concentrated,
this does not necessarily suggest that
future production will be similarly
geographically restrained. The future
production situation is mixed. For some
strategic minerals, the reserve base is more
geographically concentrated than the
present production. For others, the raw
materials are more widely dispersed. In
the case of some of the most concentrated
raw materials, particularly those largely
found in China, such as rare earths, the
future reserves are less concentrated than
present production would suggest.
Since early 90s, Chinese rare earth
producers have had an unregulated
approach to the supply in the
international market. This has been
exploited by a concentrated number of
buyers who have collaborated to force
prices down. As China gradually increased
its bargaining power by restricting supply
with tightening market, rare earth prices
have improved significantly over the
years.  Whilst the next 5 to 10 years, global
demand will surpass supply, China Rare
Earth export quotas will play a critical
element in the supply chain of rare earths
out side China.
There are few basic features of Chinese
supply that we can derive from the above
analysis. The main aspects include, China
still hold more than 36 million tonnes of
rare earth oxide reserves, excessive
secondary processing capacity and
easy availability of cheap processing
chemicals, and heavy investment in
research and technology. However the
supply of Chinese heavy rare earth is finite
with 15- 20 years of mine life and Chinese
are rigorously regulating the mines on
environmental grounds.
To control the supply China has
introduced a number of measures such
as imposing 15 percent of taxes on light
rare earths oxides and neodymium metal
and, 25 percent tax on heavy rare earths
and other metals. Government has
recommended that the management of
rare earth mines should be consolidated
under three four main enterprises and has
stepped up efforts to restructure the rare
earth industry and has introduced
favorable policies, and is encouraging
acquisitions and mergers to restructure
the sector. According to plans, the Chinese
government will bring down the number
of rare earth companies from 90 to 20
within 2015. These measures will have
short – medium term repercussions in the
international market and industrial
applications.
There is no rare earth source that can
match the Baotou tailings dump, these
deposits can be found all over the world.
China’s actions have put this issue firmly
on the radar screen and countries are
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getting serious about developing new
sources. Several new overseas mine
projects are in the pipeline but few are
likely to be able to compete with China
on prices. Besides, it would require at least
a decade before new mines can make an
impact on the global market and the
study shows that China will continue to
control the global market for some time
to come.
China’s control over rare earth
elements has the potential to increase
foreign dependence on China for finished
goods. China has adopted various policies
to further develop the rare earth industry
at its roots. China’s vision is to increase
industrial utilization of rare earth
elements and control the market of rare
earth applications.
China recognized the strategic value
of its RE resources long before the days
of Deng Xiaoping. With skill, patience
and investment China has transformed
the Rare Earth industry into what it is
today. Government support of advanced
curricula in RE sciences has produced
thousands of technical professionals
employed in RE industry today.
China’s moves are creating panic in
the rare earth sector and its efforts to
monopolize the sector will backfire since
the nation’s policy makers seem to have
failed to realize that such high-handed
measures are uniting the rest of the world
against China. Business partners and
prospective investors will insist on tougher
terms of contract or develop other ways
to protect their business interests.
Most of the analysts argue that, if China
causes a shortage of rare earths, it will be a
temporary shortage, since the rising prices
for rare earth elements will serve as an
incentive for others to enter the market,
leading to greater supply. The United States,
for example, has 13 percent of known rare
earth reserves and could get back into the
production and refining business. Still, there
will be a lag before new production becomes
available, and it could easily come from an
equally troubling source. After China,
Russia has the next largest reserves (19
percent), and it is at least as likely (if not
more so) to play games with export
restrictions, and have more lax safety and
environmental standards as well.
According to Financial Times, China
wants to forge a new phase of globalization
where many of the roads – financial,
commercial and perhaps eventually
political- converge on Beijing. China is
not seeking a rupture with the
international economic system (although
some foreign companies are fearful of a
technology grab). But it is looking to
mould more of the rules, institutions and
economic relationships that are at the core
of the global economy. It is trying to forge
post-American globalization.
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While China says its deposits of rare-
earth minerals account for only about a
third of the global total, the country mines
most of the world’s marketed supply,
which has raised concerns that China
could deplete the supply too quickly. The
move to build reserves comes as China’s
supply of rare-earth metals to the rest of
the world already is shrinking despite
growing demand for the elements. In
response to Chinese restrictions on supply
the high-tech-focused nations of U.S, The
European Union, Japan and South Korea,
all of which are dependent on China for
rare-earth supplies, have highlighted
stockpiling strategies.
High-technology and environmental
applications of the rare earth elements
have grown dramatically in diversity and
importance over the past four decades.
Many of these applications are highly
specific and substitutes for REE’s are
inferior or unknown. REE’s have acquired
a level of technological significance much
greater than expected from their relative
anonymity.
If new supplies of rare earths do not
come online within the next 10 years, a
global shortage would likely to affect new
energy industry such as wind turbine,
solar panels, electric vehicle production
and electronics. According to the U.S
government report, the issue even carries
national security implications because of
the rare earth content in many advanced
military weapons, the economic threat of
depending on a single country and getting
new sources of supply into production is
not that easy. Rare earth elements are
needed for China’s expansion of its own
military needs (aircraft carriers, nuclear-
powered submarines, and ballistic
missiles). Home-grown production needs
will further cut exports already reduced
to crippling levels. Not surprisingly, these
measures have raised real concerns outside
of China regarding the future availability
of the refined products created from
REMs.
China has been strategically
motivated in the development of many
new high tech applications which have
helped quadruple the size of the RE
market since 1990. Chinese economy will
continue to grow near double digit rates
for the foreseeable future and disposable
income for automobiles, personal
electronics, etc will drive the internal
demand for REs significantly. China is
already overtaken U.S as the largest auto
market and expected to produce 500,000
electric vehicles in 2011and also leads in
wind power generation. So to meet this
increasing demand for REEs, China will
gradually reduce the exports.
So to summarize
♦ China’s RE reserves are finite.
♦ Chinese internal demand for RE
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materials and technologies is
forecasted to continue growing at
double digit rates for the foreseeable
future.
♦ These conditions will continue to drive
Chinese policies to limit RE
production and exports to better
manage its precious natural resource.
♦ China already produces 80% of global
requirement for fully dense RE
permanent magnets and 100% of the
global RE metal requirement for all
RE permanent magnets (fully dense
and bonded) produced.
♦ Prospects of the Chinese expanding
RE raw material output beyond its
own internal demand only appears to
make sense if China can leverage this
increased production to bring more
downstream manufacturing into the
country (more magnets, motors and
motor assemblies for example)
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R are earth elements (REEs) or rareearth metals are a collection of
seventeen chemical elements in the
periodic table, namely scandium, yttrium,
and the fifteen lanthanides. Scandium
and yttrium are considered rare earth
elements since they tend to occur in the
same ore deposits as the lanthanides and
exhibit similar chemical properties.
This paper is designed to evaluate the
importance of rare earth elements. The
study explores China’s role in the supply-
demand equation and price mechanism
at large and, its implications. It also
examines the history of rare earth elements
and China’s current monopoly over the
industry, including possible repercussions
and strategic implications if rare earth
supply were to be disrupted. The study
provides insights into how widely traded
these minerals are and China’s positions
in the international trade both in terms
volume and value. The study investigates
who are the major customers and
analyses the various trade restrictions
imposed by China. The study capitulate
instructive and actionable data for
considering how China’s decreasing
exports, fresh technological uses, and
rising prices are setting up an
unprecedented discussion on the REEs.
REEs were first discovered in 1787
by Lieutenant Carl Axel Arrhenius, a
Swedish army officer. Since then there has
1.  INTRODUCTION
Table 1: What are the rare earth elements?
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Ramani are gratefully acknowledged and thanks are due to other ISSSP faculties for their encouragement and help. I also would like
to thank Shruthi Shivabasavaiah for her editorial assistance.
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been a great deal of interest in their
chemical properties and potential uses.
From about the 1940s to the 1990s, REEs
attracted great interest in both the U.S.
and China’s academic and scientific
communities. Today, however, there are
only a small handful of scientists who
truly focus on REEs in the U.S. China, on
the other hand, could be setting itself up
to become a superpower in technological
innovation through its near monopoly
and its vast efforts in research and
development of REEs (Hurst Cindy,
2010).
Despite their name, rare earth
elements (with the exception of the highly
unstable promethium) are relatively
plentiful in the Earth’s crust, with cerium
being the 25th most abundant element
at 68 parts per million (similar to copper).
However, because of their geochemical
properties, rare earth elements are not
often found in concentrated and
economically exploitable forms or ores. It
was the very scarcity of these minerals
(previously called “earths”) that led to the
term “rare earth”. The first such mineral
discovered was gadolinite, a compound
of cerium, yttrium, iron, silicon and other
elements. Cerium, for example, ranks
number 26 in abundance among the
elements and is five times as common as
lead. And even the scarcest of rare earths,
Thulium, is more abundant than gold or
platinum. Because the elements share
similar chemical properties, most REEs
deposits contain a large number of all
17 elements in varying- albeit small-
concentrations. In addition, rare earths are
often of low quality, which has made the
material uneconomical to mine, and also
because the elements are usually found
within a cocktail of rare earths that need
to be separated in laborious process.
Figure 1: Basic materials supply chain
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Elemental materials are extracted from the
earth via mining. Next, they are processed
via separation and refining to obtain the
desired composition or purity. Materials
may be extracted either as major products,
where ore is directly processed to extract
the key materials or they may be co-
products or byproducts of other mining
operations. The co-production and by-
production processes create complex
relationships between the availability and
extraction costs of different materials,
which may cause supply curves and
market prices to vary in ways not captured
by simple supply and demand
relationships (DoE, US, 2010). Processed
materials are used to manufacture
component parts that are ultimately
assembled into end-use technologies. The
generic supply chain also shows the
potential for recycling and reusing
materials from finished applications,
though materials can be reclaimed at any
stage of the supply chain and reused either
upstream or downstream (DoE, US,
2010).
Rare earths are a critical component
of many high technology goods such as
hybrid vehicles, mobile telephones,
computers, televisions and energy efficient
lights. Although rare earths have relatively
a high unit value, the impact of their cost
has little, if any impact on the selling price
of the final item because they are present
in minute concentrations. RE elements
are also considered as strategically
important because of its uses in defense
and essential components to products
with high growth potential-electronics
and technology industries, energy
efficiency and greenhouse gas reduction.
Rare earth elements are important
ingredients in lasers, superconducting
magnets, batteries for hybrid automobiles;
Makers of hybrid cars use these elements
in their lanthanum nickel magnets to give
them greater rechargeable capabilities.
Portable x-ray units can function much
more effectively with thulium. Erbium-
doped fiber optic cables can amplify the
speed of communication. Night vision
goggles and rangefinder equipment use
rubidium to increase accuracy and
visibility. Radar uses the samarium
cobalt magnet to withstand stresses as it
has the highest temperature rating of any
rare earth magnet.
Even with a threefold increase in REE
demand over the past ten years, demand
is expected to increase even further, by
anywhere from 8 to 790 percent over the
next five years (Kientz R, 2010). While
REEs have been produced for almost a
century, the companies supplying them
have changed. In the mid-twentieth
century, almost all rare earth mining was
done at Mountain Pass, California. Today,
more than 97 percent of mining and
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refinement is done in China. The shift
occurred mainly due to the elaborative
separation and refining processes, which
is labor intensive, and raises safety and
environmental concerns. Not only do the
Chinese mine most of rare earths today,
they possess 36 percent of world reserves
(Hedrick. J B, 2010:129).
China’s dominance in the RE supply
chain is directly related to Beijing’s
consistent and long term planning, which
dates back to as early as the 1950s.
However, the Chinese RE industry greatly
advanced when Xu Guangxian (also
known as “The Father of Chinese Rare
Earths Chemistry”) developed the Theory
of Countercurrent Extraction-which is
applicable for the separation of a mixture
with more than ten components such as
rare earths-in the 1970s. Since then,
China’s REO output has increased
rapidly from slightly over 1,000 tonnes
in 1978 to 11,860 tonnes in 1986, when
a production spike at the giant Bayan-
obo mine first propelled China past the
United States as the world’s leading
producer of REO. Meanwhile, Beijing has
continuously invested heavily in
technological innovations through key
national R&D programs, such as the 863
and 973 projects, in order to gain a
decisive advantage in the rare earth supply
chain including mining, separation,
refining, forming and manufacturing
(Hurst Cindy, 2010:6).
According to China’s Ministry of
Science and Technology, the objective of
these program was to “advance in key
technological fields that concern the
national economy and national security;
and to achieve ‘leapfrog’ development in
key high-tech fields and take strategic
positions in order to provide high-tech
support to fulfill strategic objectives in
China’s modernization process”. In 1992
the late Chinese Prime Minister Deng
Xiaoping famously stated, “the Middle
East has oil, and China has rare earths”,
since then, China has not only remained
the world’s largest REO producer, but has
also successfully moved its manufacturers
up the supply chain (Hurst Cindy, 2010).
Since 1990, domestic consumption of
REO for high value-added product
manufacturing in China has increased at
13 percent annually, reaching 73,000
tonnes in 2009 (Song and Hong, 2010 ).
State-run labs in China have consistently
been involved in research and
development of REEs for over fifty years.
The Rare Earth Materials Chemistry and
Applications which is affiliated with
Peking University and focused on rare
earth separation techniques and, the lab
based at Changchun Institute of Applied
Chemistry. Additional labs concentrating
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on rare earth elements include the
Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths,
the largest rare earth research institution
in the world, established in 1963, and
the General Research Institute for
Nonferrous Metals established in
1952(Hurst Cindy, 2010:9). This long
term outlook and investment has yielded
significant results for China’s rare earth
industry.
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2.1 Rare Earth Element - Reserves
Reserves are the resources that could
be economically extracted or produced at
the time of determination. The term
reserves need not signify that extraction
facilities are in place and operative.
Globally, the four principal high-yield
REE-bearing minerals are bastnäsite,
monazite, xenotime and ion absorption
clays. A mineral deposit that does not fall
in any of these four categories typically
requires more metallurgical testing to
establish the mineralogy and processing
steps. The rare earth content of each
deposit is essential to estimating the
deposit’s profitability. It determines how
the ore will be processed and how
complicated it will be to separate the rare
earth elements from each other. Most rare
earth elements throughout the world are
found in deposits of the minerals
bastnaesite and monazite. Bastnaesite
deposits in the United States and China
account for the largest concentrations of
REEs, while monazite deposits in
Australia, South Africa, China, Brazil,
2.  RESERVES,
PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY
Source: United States Geological Survey Mineral and Commodity Summaries
Figure 2: REE world reserves
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Malaysia, and India account for the
second largest concentrations of REEs.
Bastnaesite occurs as a primary mineral,
while monazite is found in primary
deposits of other ores and typically
recovered as a byproduct. Over 90% of the
world’s economically recoverable rare
earth elements are found in primary
mineral deposits i.e., in bastnaesite ores
(Marc Humphries, 2010).
According to the US Geological
survey, total known reserves word wide
amounted roughly 99 million tonnes at
the end of 2009, which would last 800
years, provided production remained
unchanged at the current level of
approximately 124 thousand tonnes
compared with its peak of 137 thousand
tonnes in 2006, rare earth out put has
thus come down some 9 per cent.
There are three primary criteria, among
others, that determine the economic
feasibility of a potential rare earth mine:
tonnage, grade and the cost of refining the
rare earth mineral. A mine may be
economically viable (and therefore
attractive to investors) if a low-grade
(<5%) ore occurred with large tonnage and
familiar mineralogy or if high-grade ore
occurred with familiar mineralogy. Heavy
rare earths (atomic numbers 65–71), such
as terbium and dysprosium, along
with yttrium (atomic number 39), are
somewhat more scarce and often
concentrated in ionic adsorption clay
and xenotime, commonly found in
southeastern China (Hedrick James B,
1997:471).
China supplies approximately 95% of
global demand and consumes about 60%
of the global supply, but its reserves of
rare earths are finite. The Chinese
government has indicated that if the
exploitation of these resources is not
controlled, they could be exhausted in
20-30 years. These valuable resource
endowments are not evenly distributed in
China and about 83% of the resources are
located in Baiyunebo (Baotou, Inner
Mongolia), 8% in Shandong province, 3%
in Sichuan province (light rare earth
deposits of La, Ce, Pr, Nd Sm, Eu ). 3
percent of the deposits located in Jiangxi
province are middle and heavy rare
earth deposits (Middle: Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho,
Heavy: Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, Sc, Y). In
comparison, while most of the global
supply of heavy REs (e.g. yttrium)
originates in the “ion adsorption clay” ores
of Southern China, the proven reserves of
heavy REs in the 7 Southern Chinese
provinces are a mere 1.5 Mt (Huatai
United Securities, 2010). Since heavy REs
are considered more strategically valuable,
significant efforts have been made by
Beijing in recent years to crack down
rampant illegal mining in Southern
China.
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Reserves of medium and heavy rare
earths may only last 15 to 20 years at
the current rate of production, which could
lead to China being forced to imports
supplies. Medium and heavy rare earth,
also known as ion-adsorbed-type rare
earth, is more valuable than the lighter
variety. It is used in advanced areas such
as missiles. China’s verified reserves of
ion-adsorbed-type rare earth stood at 8
million tonnes in 2008, while reserves of
light rare earth totaled 50 to 60 million,
according to data from the Ministry of
Land and Resources.
Fujian, the province with the country’s
third richest rare earth reserve, is building
an integrated rare earth industrial park
near one of the country’s most productive
heavy rare earth mineral deposits. Located
at south Changting, the 10 sq km park
with an investment of 6 billion yuan
($905 million) is expected to be ready by
2015, according to the Chinese Society of
Rare Earth.
China’s rare earth resources are
widely distributed throughout the
country. The scattered distribution
makes it difficult to carry out efficient
oversight of the industry. The 2009-2015
Plan aims to create ‘large rare earth
districts’ to simplify management of
China’s rare earth resources. The new
plan will divide China’s industry into
three large districts -south, north, and
west. The southern district would
comprise of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian,
Hunan, and Guangxi; the northern
district would be centered on Inner
Country Reserves % of ReserveBase* % of
(Million Metric total (Million Metric total
Tonnes )  Tonnes)
United States 13.0 13 14 9.3
China 3 6 3 6 8 9 59 .3
Russia & CIS 19 19 21 14
Australia 5.4 5 5.8 3.9
India 3 .1 3 1 .3 1
Brazil Small
Malaysia Small
Others 22.0 22 23 12.5
Total 99 .0 154 .0
Source: Marc Humphries 2010
Table 2: The world wide resreves of rare earth elements as of 2009
*Reserve  Base is defined by USGS to include reserves(both economic and marginally economic)plus some
subeconomic  resources(with potential for becoming economic reserves).
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Mongolia and Shandong and the western
district would consolidate mines located
in Sichuan (Hurst Cindy, 2010). China
is also reported to have around 84
deposits /mines of rare earths, spread over
18 provinces. The proposed consolidated
rare earth districts will most likely be
under the direction of one company. If
successful, the new consolidation could
dramatically affect China’s ability to
control the flow of rare earths. During
this consolidation process there may be
unexpected supply shortages because of
shutdowns or increased availability of
products due to new efficiencies. The
details of the number of mines operating
in various provinces are indicated in
table 3.
Interestingly, the data suggests that
China has controlled output successfully
since 2006 as it sought to consolidate the
domestic industry into a handful of players.
China has long lagged behind the U.S.
technologically. However, as of the early
1990s, China’s vast rare earth resources
have propelled the country into the number
one position in the industry. Additionally,
China has set out on an expansive effort to
increase its overall technological innovation,
effort which includes the use of rare earth
elements. China’s academic focus on rare
earth elements could one day give the
country a decisive advantage over
technological innovation.
2.2 Production of Rare Earth
Elements
In fact, there are very few companies
outside China producing the metals. Inner
Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth Hi-
Tech Co. is China’s single largest producer
of the metals. China rare earth extraction
Source: Greta J. Orris and Richard I. Grauch (2002)
Table 3: Rare earth deposits/mines in China
Province No. of Mines Province No. of Mines
Fujian 3 Jiangxi 8
Gansu 1 Jilin 1
Guangdong 17 Liaoning 2
Guangxi 7 Shandong 2
Guizhou 3 Shanxi 1
Hainan 6 Sichuan 4
Hebei 3 Xinjiang 1
Hubei 3 Yunan 3
Hunan 12 Not Known 2
Inner Mongolia 5 Total 8 4
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know how is currently unparalleled, the
necessary production capacities,
infrastructure and distribution channels
all exist and, on top of that, the country
benefits from fairly lax environment and
work place safety regulations and low
labour costs. China, which once focused
on exporting rare earths in their raw
forms, has shifted its end goal from
production to innovation. In the 1970s,
China was just exporting rare earth
mineral concentrates. By the 1990s, it
began producing magnets, phosphors and
polishing powders. Now, it is making
finished products like electric motors,
batteries, LCDs, mobile phones and so on.
REE Production Trends
The significant cost advantage for
Chinese producers, which has crushed
almost all overseas competitors, is not
only driven by low labor costs, but also
unintentionally reinforced by Beijing’s
policy failures in regulating the resource
extraction sector as a whole, and the RE
industry in particular. To keep pace
with its booming economy, Beijing
promulgated the so-called “Let Water Flow
Rapidly” (You Shui Kuai Liu) policy in
1981 to stimulate a rapid spike in
resource demand without appropriate
considerations of environmental
protection, safety and sector
consolidation. The lack of entrance
standards and patent enforcement led to
a proliferation of small scale and
technologically backward mines and
separation plants.
Media reports have often pegged
China’s rare earth cost advantage on poor
environmental standards, which are a
problem in the chaotic mining operations
Figure 3: Chinese rare earth industry in the international context
Source: United States Geological Survey, formatted by CSIS
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in Southern China (Tu Kevin J, 2010).
But the truth, according to experts, is that
China’s largest source of rare earths does
not even come from a rare earth mine.
Rather, it comes out of the tailings (or
waste material) from the giant Baotou
iron ore mine in the province of Inner
Mongolia in Northern China. A cheap
processing method is used to covert them
into high-purity product. As production
from these sources continued to ramp
up in the 1990s, there was massive
overcapacity built in China, and prices
collapsed. The Chinese government
introduced the first export quotas in
1999. In less than one decade, the
permanent magnet market experienced a
complete shift in leadership. Whereas in
1998, 90 percent of the world’s magnet
production was in the United States,
Europe, and Japan, today, rare earth
magnets are sold almost exclusively by
China or using Chinese rare earth oxides.
China is now facing the possibility that
reserves of medium and heavy rare earths
might run dry within 15 to 20 years if
the current rate of production is
maintained.
The table 4 reveals that the production
in Bayan Obo remains the largest REE
industry in China contributing almost
half of the total production. The
production has been constant between the
periods 2006 and 2008 ranging between
125- 140 thousand tonnes. China has
greatly reduced the production of REE to
110-130 thousand tonnes by the end of
2010 and also restricted the exports
through various quota systems which will
be discussed in detail in section four. The
table also provides the estimated level of
REE production in China for the year
2014, increased production of 80-100
thousand tones in Bayan Obo and
160-170 thousand tonnes of total
production.
Year Bayan Obo Sichuan Ion Monazite Total
Bastnasite Bastnasite Adsorpt ion
clays
2004 42-48,000 20-24,000 28-32,000        - 9-100,000
2006 45-55,000 22-26,000 40-50,000 8-12,000 125-140,000
2008 60-70,000 10-15,000 45-55,000 8-12,000 125-140,000
2010 55-65,000 10-15,000 35-45,000 4-8,000 110-130,000
2014 80-100,000 20-40,000 40-50,000 8-12,000 160-170,000
Table 4: Chinese production of rare earth chemical concentrates 2004-14
Note: Illegal or uncontrolled mining and processing is not included. It has amounted to 10-20,000t pa REO over the last
3-5 years
Source: IMCOA, CREIC, Baogang Rare Earth Hi-Tech, Sichuan RE Association, GRIREM
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2.3 Supply of Rare Earth Elements
The supply of a material is a function
of resources, reserves and production.
“Resources” include identified and
undiscovered resources. Production
generally occurs in countries with large
resources and reserves, but exceptions
exist. In some cases, small reserve holders
may also produce the material, while
countries with no reserves could be a
major refinery producer of imported
primary or raw material.
There was still more than enough
supply reaching other markets and there
was no real talk of a problem in the sector
until the past couple of years, when
growing global demand for rare earths
highlighted the fact that China had put
everyone else out of business. Comments
from Chinese government officials started
to suggest that they view the industry as
more strategic than ever before, and were
intent on securing more supply for
domestic use. They started taking
measures to consolidate domestic supply
and reduce smuggling. Analysts are of the
opinion that by 2012, the rest of the world
could face a major supply crisis because
of China’s reduced or zero supply. The
demand-supply is expected to touch
30,000–40,000 tonnes by 2012 in the
absence of any new large supplier (David
Anthony, 2010). The growing economy of
China is creating a worldwide risk to
supply and China’s growing consumption
limits its exports of rare earths. China
insists that it requires the high supplies
to meet the demands of its clean energy
and high-tech sectors.
Most of the rare earth enterprises
locate around the large rare earth mines,
such as Baotou city, Sichuan province and
Ganzhou city. There are about 24
enterprises for rare earth concentrate
production, and 100 rare earth enterprises
for smelting separation production in
China. Most of the REE supply originated
from the Baotou plant was about 55000t
and the total supply from China were
about 103300t in 2010. The global
supply increased to 15000 in 2010 from
the 2005 level of 10500t to meet the
increasing demand from the automotive
and technology sectors.
The table 5 reveals a number of
developments in production and supply
of rare earths by 2014 and shows that a
10 percent increase in production at
Baotou plant from 2010 to14 and full
production quota to be utilized at
Sichuan with production of 20000t. The
supply from Iconic clay regions will be
reduced to 30000t by 2014 with a little
increase in supply from recycling in China.
Chinese restrictions on supply in 2010
have triggered many countries too look
for alternative sources and by 2014 a
number countries will be in a position to
RARE EARTH ELEMENTS IN CHINA: GROWTH, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS
13
supply some amount of rare earth as the
data shows that the mount weld mine in
Australia is expected to supply about
22000t and mountain pass in California
is expected to supply 20000 tonnes along
with supplies from Russia, CIS countries
and India. One of the largest growth areas
is expected to be the production of hybrid
vehicles, such as the Toyota Prius. Each
hybrid car contains 16 kg of rare earths,
predominantly in its batteries and electric
motors (Lun Joe, 2006).
The table also shows that the supply
from recycling in China increases
marginally from 3300t in 2010 to 4000t
in 2014 and from 1500t to 1800t in
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global supply. The reuse and recycling
capacity currently limited as recovery of
manufacturing waste and measurable
recovery from aftermarket products are yet
to develop. Also recycling them is often
difficult and expensive, because they are
often mixed with other materials when
products are made. And there is little
economic incentive to recycle, since rare
earth elements are available raw on the
world market at comparatively low prices.
However, improved designs for recycling
coupled with larger streams of materials
could eventually allow for the economical
recycling and reuse of magnetic materials.
Table 6 shows that most of the oxides
are produced at different mine sites in
China. The industry in Malaysia is largely
dependent on the ores from Australia.
Most analysts believe China will
eventually change its quota system to
restrict the rare earths individually.
Because China has an abundance of light
rare earths available through the Bayan
Obo project in Mongolia, changing the
quota system would likely trigger a
sudden flood of cerium and lanthanum
on to the market. Even with new mines
coming online within the next five years,
analysts are forecasting a shortage of
heavy rare earths terbium and
dysprosium by 2015, and a very tight
supply of light rare earths neodymium
and praseodymium. Of note is that nearly
all rare earth deposits contain the
radioactive material thorium and the cost
of treating and storing thorium is an
important factor in evaluating the
economics of a mine. This may be
particularly true to the rare earth
Table 6: Rare earths types and contents of major contributing source minerals
supplying REEs to the global market (percentage of total rare earth oxides)
L I G H T M E D I U M H E A V Y
Source: U.S Department of Energy (2010)
T Y P E Location (s) L a C e P r N d S m E u G d T b D y H o E r T m Y b L u Y
Currently Active:
Bastnasite Byan obo Inner
Mongolia 23 50 6.2 18.5 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Xenomite Lahat, perak,
Malaysia 1.2 3.1 0.5 1.6 1.1 0 3.5 0.9 8.3 2.0 6.4 1.1 6.8 1 61
Rare earth laterite Xunwu, Jianxi
China 43.4 2.4 9.0 31.7 3.9 0.5 3.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.1 8
Ion adsorption Longnan,Jianxi,
clays China 1.8 0.4 0.7 3.0 2.8 0.1 6.9 1.3 6.7 1.6 4.9 0.7 2.5 0.4 65
Loparite Lovozerskaya,
Russia 28 57.5 3.8 8.8 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Various India 23 46 5 20 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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production in Kerala, India where the
deposits of thorium is very high.  In
general, each rare earth ore body is unique
and requires a site-specific processing
system. As a result, production costs vary
from deposit to deposit based on ore
content and mineralogy.
The development of increased
stockpiling of REE in China has gained
momentum in recent years with assertion
of government authority in recent years
over mining regions. The Chinese
stockpiling, under the direction of the
Ministry of Land and Resources, began
with a pilot project in early 2010 in
China’s primary mining region of Baotou
in Inner Mongolia. At least 10 storage
facilities are being built and managed by
the world’s largest producer of rare-earth
metals; government-controlled Baotou
Steel Rare-Earth (Group) Hi-Tech Co.
Chinese state media reports say stockpiles
may eventually top 100,000 metric tonnes
(James T. Areddy, 2011). The move to
build reserves comes as China’s supply
of rare-earth metals to the rest of the world
already is shrinking despite growing
demand for the elements. In response to
Chinese restrictions on supply the high-
tech-focused nations of U.S, The European
Union, Japan and South Korea, all of
which are dependent on China for rare-
earth supplies, have highlighted
stockpiling strategies.
There are few basic features of Chinese
supply that we can derive from the above
analysis. The facts include, China still hold
more than 25 million tonnes of rare earth
oxide reserves, excessive secondary
processing capacity and easy availability
of cheap processing chemicals, and heavy
investment in research and technology.
Moreover, the supply of Chinese heavy rare
earth are finite with 15- 20 years of mine
life, Chinese are rigorously regulating the
mines on environmental grounds. After
China gained decisive advantage in the
RE supply chain, Beijing’s restrictions on
REO production and exports in recent
years have been primarily motivated by
the strong political desire for resource
conservation.
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T he two major drivers ofdemand for mineral
commodities are the rate of overall
economic growth, (stable or decline) and
the state of development for principal
material applications (e.g., clean energy
technologies). Demand for key materials
in clean energy technologies compete for
available supply with demand for the
same materials in other applications.1
With 1.3 billion people and the fastest
growing economy in the world, China is
faced with the challenging task of
ensuring it has adequate natural resources
to sustain economic growth. There is also
a growing school of thought that China
is not actually able, at present, to use all
of the materials allocated for domestic use
only.  “Out of a production level of perhaps
100,000 tonnes of total rare earth oxides
in past years,” the bulk of that material
has ended up being purchased by end-
users in first-world nations (US DOE,
2010).
World demand for rare earth elements
are estimated at 134,000 tonnes per year,
with global production around 124,000
tonnes annually. The difference is covered
by above-ground stocks or inventories.
World demand is projected to rise to
180,000 tonnes annually by 2012, while
it is unlikely that new mine output will
close the gap in the short term. By 2014,
global demand for rare earth elements
may exceed 200,000 tonnes per year.
China’s output may reach 160,000
tonnes per year (up from 130,000 tonnes
in 2008) in 2014.  An additional capacity
3.  DEMAND AND INDUSTRIAL
APPLICATIONS OF RARE EARTH
ELEMENTS
1 Generally and with respect to the key materials, demand for end-use items for building use (e.g., phosphors
for lighting) or construction tend to be more cyclical, whereas those that enter big-ticket consumer items
such as cars tend to be more volatile and sensitive to short-term economic movements. Uses that enter
portable devices and personal consumer goods (e.g., batteries for portable electronics) tend to experience
more stable demand. Regional factors are important also: China’s and India’s rapid economic growth
have had and will continue to have a huge impact on global demand for mineral commodities (Eggert RG,
2010).
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shortfall of 40,000 tonnes per year may
occur. This potential shortfall has raised
concerns in the major rare earth
consuming countries. New mining
projects could easily take 10 years for
development. In the long run, however, the
USGS expects that reserves and
undiscovered resources are large enough
to meet demand. This expected growth,
coupled with the recent export cuts from
China, has end users of rare earths
scrambling for supplies.
Just as world wide demand for REO
is growing, so too is China’s own demand.
Data from the Chinese society of Rare
earths (CSRE) show that the country’s
consumption has grown rapidly since
2004 and reached over 70,000 tonnes in
2008. Growth in demand from China will
continue to outpace the rest of the world.
By the year of 2015, it is estimated that
the global demand of rare earths is
expected to reach 210 thousand tonnes;
China’s domestic demand will be 138,000
tonnes. By 2020, China’s domestic
demand is expected to reach 190,000
tonnes, including 130,000 tonnes
consumed in high-tech fields, account for
68% of global total consumption. It can
be concluded that Rare Earth Materials
has become a major growth point of China
rare earth industry (Chen Zhanheng,
2010). China, Japan and the United
States are the largest consumers of rare
earth metals. With the growing demand
for ‘green’ products, the demand for rare
earth metals is only expected to increase.
The annual growth in demand is expected
to hover around 10%. China started a
program wherein it not only mined and
produced these rare earth elements but
also manufactured the finished goods. So,
Figure 4: Forecast global demand for rare earths by market in 2014
(t REO ±15%)
Source IMCOA, Roskill, 2010
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not only does the country produce 97%
of the world’s REEs but also uses
approximately 70% of that material to
build products domestically. Thus, China
came to dominate the entire industry.
The most rapid growth has been in
demand from new materials, that include
magnets, phosphors, catalysts and
batteries, which now account for over 60%
of the country’s demand. This demand as
no doubt been and will continue to be
fueled by heavy investments in clean
energy.
The Figure shows the Chinese
consumption of rare earths from 1990 to
2008. It can be noticed that the
consumption of rare earths in China
increased rapidly since 2004. During the
last 20 years from 1990 to 2008, China
annual consumption increased from 1
thousand tonnes to 72.6 thousand tonnes,
it was a tremendous increase of 72.6
times. The consumption was 67.68
thousand tonnes in 2008, a slight decrease
compared with that in 2007. The main
reason for this tremendous growth is
that ever increasing production of
manufacturing items in china such
wind mills, solar panels, electronic
commodities.
High-technology and environmental
applications of the rare earth elements
have grown dramatically in diversity and
importance over the past four decades.
Many of these applications are highly
specific and substitutes for REE’s are
inferior or unknown. REE’s have acquired
a level of technological significance much
Source: Chen Zhanheng, 2010
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greater than expected from their relative
obscurity. These uses range from
mundane (lighter flints, glass polishing)
to high-tech (phosphors, lasers, magnets,
batteries, magnetic refrigeration) to
futuristic (high-temperature
superconductivity, safe storage and
transport of hydrogen for a post-
hydrocarbon economy). The rare earth
elements are essential for a diverse and
expanding array of high-technology
applications (Quantum Rare Earth
Development Corp, 2011).
The table 7 depicts the REE products
and their applications. Dysprosium and
terbium are alloyed into rare earths
magnets to make them capable of
operating at elevated temperatures. At
current alloying levels, dysprosium and
terbium make up about 5% of the metal
used in these car battery magnets. The
majority of applications depend on the
rare earth magnets. China exported
10,000 tonnes of rare earth magnets
worth $400 million and 34,600 tonnes
of other rare earth products worth $500
million in 2008. The rare earths market
represented approximately USD 1.25
billion in 2008. Over the past decade,
market growth has been in the range of
8-11% per year, with the exception of the
correction in 2001/02 due to the fall in
technology markets and the global
economic crisis. While the global financial
and economic crisis in 2009 reduced
consumption of REE, the industry growth
Table 7: Major products and applications of rare earth products
Rare Earths Products Industrial applications
Nd, Pr, Sm, Magnets Demand for large magnets for permanent magnet motors in
Tb, Dy HEVs, EVs, and Maglev trains, also increased demand for
HDDs and ODDs, mobile phones, MP3 playes, cameras, VCMs
La, Ce, Pr, Nd Battery alloy Rising demand for HEVs
Eu, Y, Tb, La, Dy, Phosphors Increased use of energy efficient fluresent lights, also growing
Ce, Pr, Gd demand for LCDs, PDPs
La, Ce, Pr, Nd Fluid cracking Increased use of catalysts in processing heavy crude and tar
catalysts sands
Ce, La, Nd Auto catalysts Tighter NOx and Sox standards – offset to some extent by
increased use of zirconia in the wash coat
Ce, La, Nd Polishing Increased demand for mechano- chemical polishing of
powders electronic components, and some types of LCd screens
La,Ce, Pr, Nd, Y Ceramics Growth in use of multi-layer ceramic capacitors, use of PSZ
in advanced applications
Notes: HEV = Hybrid Electric Vehicle, EV = Electric Vehicle
HDD = Hard Disc Drive;   ODD = Optical Disc Drive;    VCM = Voice Coul Motor;   LCD = Liquid Crystal Display;
CRT = Cathode Ray Tube;   PSZ = Partially Stabilised Zirconia
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returned to 8-11% in late 2010
(Kingsnorth D, 2010).
Table 8 reveals a number features of
rare earth demand in 2008. The Chinese
demand constitutes about 67 percent of
global demand followed by Japan and
North East Asian countries and USA.
Magnets, metal alloys and catalysts
were in high demand compare other
applications and these are highly used in
industrial applications of hybrid vehicles,
electronic vehicles, hard disc drive, optical
disc drive, voice coul motor, liquid crystal
display, cathode ray tubes and petroleum
refining industries. The demand for
magnets was equal to21 percent followed
by 20 percent demand for catalysts and
about 18 percent demand for metal alloys.
Magnets phosphors and metal alloys are
the largest end uses for rare earths by
value.
In China and globally, REEs have
experienced fast growth in advanced
technology sectors including luminescent
(phosphors), magnetic, catalytic and
hydrogen storage technologies. The demand
by clean energy technology sectors is largely
a result of the ramp-up of clean energy
technology manufacturing and use by the
United States, other Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) nations and China. Magnets
dominated REE usage by weight in 2008,
with catalysts claiming the second-highest
usage and metal alloys accounting for the
third highest (Kingsnorth and Chegwidden
2010). REE consumption has grown most
rapidly in China. China’s 2005 REO
demand exceeded half of global demand for
the first time and more than tripled in
absolute terms between 2000 and 2008
(Chen Z 2010).
Table 8: Global rare earths demand in 2008 in tonnes and by value
Application China Japan & U S A Others Total Volume Total
NE Asia %  value %
Catalysts 9000 3000 9500 3500 25000 20% 5%
Glass 7500 2000 1000 1500 12000 10% 2%
Polishing 8000 4500 1000 1500 15000 12% 4%
Metal Alloys 15500 4500 1250 1000 22500 18% 14%
Magnets 21000 3500 750 1000 26250 21% 37%
Phosphors 5500 2500 500 500 9000 7% 31%
Ceramics 2500 2500 1250 750 7000 6% 4%
Other 5000 2000 250 250 7500 6% 3%
Total 74000 24500 15500 10000 124000 100% US$6.75b
Source: Roskill, IMCOA, 2010 and author’s calculations
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In China, rare earths were mainly
consumed in traditional areas of
metallurgy, machinery, petroleum
industry, chemical industry, light industry,
textile industry, agriculture, in new
materials like magnets, phosphors,
hydrogen storage, catalysts for
automobile exhaust and polishing
powder. There was a dramatic change in
the consumption structure, the
consumption of rare earths in new
materials increased very fast since 2004.
In 1988, the consumption of rare earths
in new materials was only 1%, but in
2007, it was 53%. In 2008, it was claimed
that about 60% of rare earths was
consumed in new materials in China.
China’s consumption of rare earth
elements is also expected to increase
dramatically as more and more foreign
companies move their production sites to
China to take advantage of the lower cost
of rare earths and therefore reduce their
overall production costs. This is part of
China’s larger strategy to maintain a tight
hold on the industry.
In 2009, China produced about 7,200
tonnes of rare earth fluorescent powder,
ranking the world Top. The three-band
fluorescent lamp industry consumed 75%
of rare earth luminescent materials as the
major application area of luminescent
materials. The three-band fluorescent
lamp with the advantages of energy
Figure 6: China: consumption structure of rare earths from 1988 to 2008
Source: The Chinese Society of Rare Earth, Nomura International Hong Kong
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saving and long lifespan will gradually
replace the incandescent lamp. In 2009,
China produced over 3 billion three-band
fluorescent lamps. If 80% of the
incandescent lamps are replaced, 3 billion
three-band fluorescent lamps will be
needed every year. Hence, the annual
demand for fluorescent powder is about
10,000 tonnes. By 2015, the total
demand for three-band fluorescent powder
will be about 60,000 tonnes.
In 2008, the consumption of rare
earth polishing powder in the world was
20,000 tonnes, including 8,000 tonnes
for LCD. In recent years, with the booming
of the LCD industry, high-performance
polishing powder has achieved fast
development. Presently, the production
capacity of rare earth polishing powder
in China exceeded 150 million tonnes. It
is forecast that China’s annual production
capacity of rare earth polishing powder
will reach 20,000 tonnes in 2010. In
2009, the rare earth consumed in Chinese
petrochemical catalytic cracking sector
was about 7,500 tonnes. It is forecast that
China’s crude oil processing volume will
maintain over 500 million tonnes in
2015-2020. The rare earth for FCC
catalysts will exceed 10,000 tonnes.
Besides, with the considerable growth of
the demand for rare earth catalytic
materials in the fields of fuel cell, water
pollution control, air purification, etc.,
China’s total demand for rare earth
catalytic materials will exceed 17,000
tonnes in 2015-2020 (China Research
and Intelligence, 2010).
Because of their ability to readily
give up and accept electrons, the rare
earth elements have become uniquely
indispensable in many electronic, optical,
magnetic and catalytic applications. From
iPods to catalytic converters, from wind
power generators to computer disc drives
and hybrid electric vehicles - Rare Earth
applications are ubiquitous and critical
for the overall economic well being of any
country. China is most interested in
supplying its domestic needs first.
Because there’s such a wide range of
products that use rare earth elements, its
domestic REE-product industry is
growing rapidly. China’s doing everything
it can to bring new investment into the
country and develop new industries to use
this material; for example, it will sell REEs
to local industries at a much cheaper price
than it sells the same material to sources
outside of China. In that sense, it’s trying
to do everything it can to increase the
country’s internal need.
The data released by Lynas Corp
shows that global supplies of rare-earth
elements will fall short of demand, which
will grow by an average of 9 percent
annually to the year 2014. The largest
growth rate will be in demand for magnets
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and battery alloys which would be 12
percent and 15 percent respectively by
2014. Total demand for the group of
elements, used in products such as
industrial magnets, flat-screen TVs, and
military weapons systems, is likely to grow
to 190,100 metric tonnes in 2014, from
136,100 tonnes in 2010. For example,
permanent magnet demand is expected
to grow by 10%-16% per year through
2014. Demand for rare earths in auto
catalysts and petroleum cracking
catalysts is expected to increase between
6% and 8% each year over the same
period. Demand increases are also
expected for rare earths in flat panel
displays, hybrid vehicle engines, and
defense and medical applications. The
global demand in value terms will grow
from US$7.8 billion in 2010 to 11.2
billion in 2014.
3.1 Consumption and Industrial
Applications
The rare earth elements as a group
have magnetic, chemical and
spectroscopic properties that have led to
their application in wide range of end-
uses.   These metals are utilized in a broad
range of manufacturing areas that include
materials, machineries and electronics.
These are the raw materials for high value
added products. Although often needed
only in small quantities, these metals are
increasingly essential to the development
of technologically sophisticated products.
They play a critical role in the development
of innovative ‘environmental technologies’
Table 9: Global rare earths demand in tonnes 2010 & 2014
Appl i ca t ion D e m a n d Vo l u m e Va l u e D e m a n d G r o w t h Va l u e
t o n n e s ( % ) ( % )  tonnes 2014 rate p.a. (%) ( % )
Magnets 35000 26% 38% 55100 12% 42%
Battery Alloys 18600 14% 10% 32500 15% 13%
Metallurgy ex battery 11700 9% 7% 12700 2% 5%
Auto Catalysts 9000 7% 5% 12200 8% 4%
Fluid cracking
Catalysts 21300 16% 11% 24900 4% 9%
Polishing 19100 14% 10% 28000 10% 10%
Glass 7800 6% 4% 7800 0% 3%
Phosphors 7900 6% 10% 10800 8% 10%
Others 5700 4% 5% 6100 6% 5%
Total 136 100 100% US$7.8 bln 190100 9% 11.2 b
Source: Lynas Corp, 2010
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to boost energy efficiency and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Demand for rare
earths, often referred to as “industrial
vitamins,” will only increase.  Several clean
energy technologies-including wind
turbines, electric vehicles, photovoltaic cells
and fluorescent lighting-use materials at
risk of supply disruptions in the short term.
Those risks will generally decrease in the
medium and long term.
Clean energy technologies currently
constitute about 20 percent of global
consumption of critical materials. As clean
energy technologies are deployed more
widely in the decades ahead, their share
of global consumption of critical materials
will likely grow. Green energy technology
is expected to become the largest
consumer of rare earth elements in the
future. In 2009 China was the world’s top
investor in clean energy technology at over
$34 billion. Since 2005, the country’s wind
generation capacity has increased by more
than 100% a year. The government’s
renewable energy policy aims to procure
15% of the country’s energy from non-
carbon sources by 2020, twice the
proportion of 2005. In 2009, China
became the largest manufacturer of wind
turbines in the world, with 17 of its 40
turbine manufacturers being state-owned,
12 private Chinese firms, and 11 joint
ventures or foreign owned (The Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2010).
The country has doubled its installed
wind power capacity every year since
2006 and is now the world’s largest
producer of wind turbine. By 2020, China
is expected to boost its wind power
capacity to 100 Giga watts (GW) or more,
up from 12 GW in 2008. The annual
growth rate will be about 20 percent
(China Daily, 2009). Similarly, the Global
Wind Energy Council (GWEC) forecasts
that the global installed wind capacity in
2011 will climb to 409 GW, up from
158.5 GW at the end of 2009. The
additional 250.5 GW will require
167,000 tonnes of REMs. China has
announced that in the next ten years it
will “construct some 133 giga watts of
wind turbine generated electricity.”
Around two tonnes of neodymium is
needed for each wind turbine and NdFeB
magnets are a critical component for some
models of the new generation wind-
powered turbines.
Hydrogen-fuel based cars, for
example, require platinum-based
catalysts; electric-hybrid cars need lithium
batteries; and rhenium super alloys are
an indispensable input for modern
aircraft production. In 2009, China
produced 19,000 tonnes of rare earth
hydrogen storage materials. They
consumed 7,900 tonnes of rare earth,
accounting for 11% of the total rare earth
consumption. Since November 2009,
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China has become the largest auto market
in the world. China’s automobile industry
has been in rapid development since the
early 1990s. In 2009, China produced
13.79 million units of automobile. The
Chinese are also investing big in electric
cars, hybrid cars and the underlying
industry. The Chinese are already one of
the largest producers of lithium-ion
batteries and as the main application in
car batteries; lithium-ion demand is
growing fast. Rare earth hydrogen storage
materials are major raw materials for the
production of nickel-hydrogen battery. As
nickel-hydrogen battery shows positive
development prospects in the electric tool
and electric vehicle sectors, it is forecast
that China’s hybrid electric vehicle market
will acquire explosive growth after 2010
and the annual growth rate will reach
12% (China Research and Intelligence,
2010).
According to Reuters, global sales of
hybrid electric cars are forecast to reach 3
million units in 2015 with a total REM
requirement of 33,000 tonnes. One of the
largest growth areas is expected to be the
production of hybrid vehicles, such as the
Toyota Prius. Each hybrid car contains
16 kg of rare earths, predominantly in its
batteries and electric motors. It is
estimated that the motor in the average
Prius hybrid uses about 193 grams, or
about 7 ounces, of neodymium and 24
grams of dysprosium, while the fully
electric Nissan Leaf uses about 421 grams
of neodymium and 56 grams of
dysprosium.
The Chinese government, determined
to become a world leader in green
technology, and plans to invest billions
of dollars over the next few years to
develop electric and hybrid vehicles. A
group of 16 big state-owned companies
had already agreed to form an alliance to
do research and development, and creates
standards for electric and hybrid vehicles.
The plan aims to put more than a million
electric and hybrid vehicles on the road
over the next few years in what is already
the world’s biggest and fastest growing
auto market. The announcement, analysts
say, is another example of how China
seeks to marshal resources and tackle
industries and new markets. The plan also
underlines what China describes as its
growing commitment to combating
pollution and reducing carbon emissions.
The Chinese government announced
it will spend $14.7 billion through 2020
on alternative drive train vehicles, with
the bulk of the money going towards all-
electric vehicles. Pike Research, projects
that between 2010 and 2015, China will
have 1.85 million hybrids and EVs sold,
with 1 million EVs on the road. In the
U.S. more than 2.3 million hybrids will
be sold during that time, and 840,000
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
26
plug-in and all-electric vehicles. At the
2010 Beijing Motor Show, more than 20
electric vehicles were on display, most of
which came from native automakers. As
of May 2010, at least 10 all-electric
models have been reported to be on track
for volume-production. The first mass
produced plug-in hybrid car (BYD
F3DM), all-electric minivan (Luxgen 7
MPV EV) and all-electric long-range bus
(500 km range Zonda Bus) are Chinese
(Gartner John , 2010).
Many of the rare earth metals are also
used in sectors such as semi-conductors.
The semiconductor industry is dominated
by Chinese Taipei, South Korea, United
States, and Japan. The role of the semi-
conductor industry is one of a technology
enabler: the semiconductor industry is
widely recognized as a key driver
for economic growth throughout the
electronics value chain. The semiconductor
market represented USD213 billion in
2004 and the industry was one enabling
factor in the generation of USD1200 billion
in electronic systems business and USD
5000 billion in services, representing close
to 10% of world GDP that year. The semi-
conductor industry is also a high-growth
industry, experiencing 13% growth on
average per annum over the last 20 years
(Korinek, J. and J. Kim, 2010).
Table 10: Annual sales of Toyota prius worldwide and by region (in thousands)





2000 19.0 12.5 5.8 5.6 0.7 0.01
2001 29.5 11.0 16.0 15.6 2.3 0.2
2002 28.1 6.7 20.3 20.1 0.8 0.2
2003 43.2 17.0 24.9 24.6 0.9 0.4
2004 125.7 59.8 55.9 54.0 8.1 1.9
2005 175.2 43.7 109.9 107.9 18.8 2.9
2006 185.6 48.6 109.0 107.0 22.8 5.3
2007 281.3 58.3 183.8 181.2 32.2 7.0
2008 285.7 73.1 163.3 158.6 41.5 7.7
2009 404.2 208.9 144.3 139.7 42.6 8.4
Jan-Sept2010 401.3 254.2 105.9 103.3 35.5 5.8
Total 2,011 826.9 939.1 917.5 206.1 39.7
Source: Toyota Corporation
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There are numerous examples that
point to China’s anticipated increase in
rare earth consumption. For example, at
the end of July 2008, China had 600
million cell phone users. Less than one
year later, by the end of March 2009,
China had 670 million cell phone users
(Xinhuanet, 2009). China’s mobile phone
industry has high growth rate, raising its
share on the global mobile phone market.
During 2007, 600 million mobile phones
were made in China which accounted for
over 50% of the global production. The
domestic sales of cell phone made a
breakthrough of 100 million in China in
2006. In 2007, the domestic sales of cell
phone in china were 190 million,
increased by 74%. For year of 2007, sales
volume had reached about 23 billion USD,
increased by 17% as compared with 2006.
The export volume of China’s cell phones
added up to a record high of 385 million
in 2006, increased by 69.3% as compared
with 2005. In 2007, this figure reached
483 million, increased by 125.45% as
compared with 2006. As far as 2006, the
export volume had reached 31.214 billion
USD, increased by 52.47% as compared
with 2005. The export volume of 2007
was 35.6 billion dollars, increased by
114.01% as compared with 2006 (Pr-
inside, 2008).
The rare earth metals are critical for
the production of smart bombs, laser
targeting systems in tanks, and silent
technology used in helicopter blades. The
rare earth metals of most concern to the
military and the Defense Department are
neodymium, samarium, and yttrium.
Neodymium is an essential metal in a
magnetic alloy which was developed
separately by General Motors in Detroit
and Sumitomo Special Metals Co. in
Japan in the 1980s. Now it is used in
speaker magnets, disk drives, motors,
and, more importantly, in missile weapons
systems like the Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM). Neodymium is also
used in magnets for hybrid-electric
motors being developed to cut fuel use in
U.S. Navy destroyers. Samarium is needed
for magnets being used by Lockheed
Martin Corp.’s SPY-1 radar systems on
Aegis destroyers. China is the only
supplier in the world for yttrium which is
needed for the laser gun sights in the
General Dynamics Abrams tank (RC Zar,
2010).
The DDG-51 Hybrid Electric Drive
Ship Program uses neodymium iron
boron magnets which help power the
guided destroyers. Night vision goggles
and rangefinder equipment use rubidium
to increase accuracy and visibility. The
Aegis Spy-1 Radar uses the samarium
cobalt magnet to withstand stresses as it
has the highest temperature rating of any
rare earth magnet. Even with a threefold
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increase in REE demand over the past ten
years, demand is expected to increase even
further, by anywhere from 8 to 790
percent over the next five years (Kientz
R, 2010).
Rare earth elements are needed for
China’s expansion of its own military
needs (aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and ballistic missiles).
Home-grown production needs will
further cut exports already reduced to
crippling levels. Not surprisingly, these
measures have raised real concerns outside
of China regarding the future availability
of the refined products created from
REMs. The rare earth supply chain for the
sleep paralyzed Western defense industries
is now being held hostage by the Chinese
who want to keep the rare earth metals
for their own rapidly expanding markets.
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T he growing number ofapplications for rare earths,
coupled with the burgeoning demand for
clean energy and the latest consumer
technologies has raised the threat of
an acute shortage in rare earths, as
production has struggled to keep up.
Many of the world’s experts foresee a
supply deficit of REO by 2014 as demand
over time is expected to exceed the
industry’s ability to produce and as
commercial stocks are depleted. While
new or reopened mines outside of china
are expected to increase global production,
resulting in an over all surplus, shortfalls
are expected in certain elements,
particularly in Neodymium and
Europium, and the heavy rare earths
Terbium, Dysprosium, and Yttrium.
Demand for rare-earth metals is likely to
increase between 10 percent and 20
percent each year, analysts say, thanks to
growing demand for elements like
neodymium, which is used in making
hybrid electric vehicles and generators for
wind turbines.
4.  GLOBAL DEMAND-
SUPPLY INTERFACE BY 2014
Source: Roskill, IMCOA, CREIC, Neo Materials Technology
Figure 7: World supply/demand balance for rare earths, 2004-2014 (t REO)
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World demand for rare earth elements
are estimated at 134,000 tonnes per year,
with global production around 124,000
tonnes annually. The difference is covered
by above-ground stocks or inventories.
World demand is projected to rise to
180,000 tonnes annually by 2012, while
it is unlikely that new mine output will
close the gap in the short term. By 2014,
global demand for rare earth elements
may exceed 200,000 tonnes per year.
China’s output may reach 160,000
tonnes per year (up from 130,000 tonnes
in 2008) in 2014 (Marc Humphries,
2010). An additional capacity shortfall of
40,000 tonnes per year may occur. New
production from ROW could meet
increased demand to 2014-but will the
“balance” be right? This brings spotlight
on the absolute necessity for other
countries get to full-scale rare earth
production sufficient to meet global
demand and to deploy a complete mining-
to-magnets manufacturing supply chain
as soon as possible outside China.
The above table shows that the global
demand REO in 2014 will be around
180-190,000t a little less than the global
supply of 190-210,000t. However some
individual oxides will be in short of
supply particularly the heavy rare earths
like Terbium, Dysprosium and Yttrium,
their proportion to the total demand is
comparatively less, although their
importance to some the applications are
very important. Since supply of these
elements is going to be so tight, the prices
for Tb, Dy and Y will remain strong.
Neodymium iron boron permanent
magnet is the leading product among rare
earth magnetic materials. With the
development of new application areas, it
is forecast that the global neodymium
iron boron industry will maintain the
growth rate of 15% in the coming five
years, whereas Chinese neodymium iron
Table 11: Forecast supply and demand for selected rare earths in 2014
Rare Earth Oxide Demand @ % Supply @ %
tpa REO tpa REO
Lanthanum 50-55000t 28.4% 52-57000t 26.9%
Cerium 60-65000t 36.5% 80-85000t 40.2%
Neodymium 34900t 19.4% 33000t 16.3%
Terbium 400-500t 0.3% 400-500t 0.2%
Dysprosium 1900-2300t 1.1% 1800-2000t 0.9%
Yttrium 10-14000t 6.7% 9-13000t 5.7%
Total 180-190,000t 100% 190-210,000t 100%
IMCOA, 2009
RARE EARTH ELEMENTS IN CHINA: GROWTH, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS
31
boron industry will maintain the growth
rate of 20% and the global demand for
Neodymium will outstrip the global
supply with a thousand tonnes marginal
difference in 2014.
The rare earth content of NdFeB
magnets varies by manufacturer and
application. An electric drive vehicle may
use up to a kilogram (kg) of Nd, while
each wind turbine may contain several
hundred kilograms. Rare earth PMs may
also incorporate praseodymium (Pr),
which can be substituted for or combined
with Nd. Dysprosium (Dy) or terbium
(Tb) may also be added to the inter
metallic alloy to increase the temperature
at which the magnet can operate before
losing its magnetic. The cumulative
demand for Nd and other REEs in these
clean energy technologies is a function of
both the material content per individual
product and the total number of products
sold. Therefore, aggressive technology
penetration rates envisioned under many
worldwide clean energy strategies could
significantly increase global demand for
Nd, Pr, Dy and Tb (London I.M. 2010).
Chinese economy will continue to
grow or near double digit rates for the
foreseeable future and disposable income
for automobiles, personal electronics, etc
driving significant internal RE demand.
China is already the largest auto market
and will produce 500,000 electric vehicles
in 2011 and, leads in wind power
generation. So to meet this increasing
demand for REEs, China has employed a
number of controls to date such as,
production limits, export quotas, export
tariffs, stockpiling, closing of separation
plants and even literally blowing up illegal
mines (REITA, 2011).
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T he section examines the tradein rare earths and importance
and Chinese export restrictions. Rare
earths were traded freely and at a
discounted price on the global market
before the mid-2000s. Since 2005,
however, China-the world’s leading RE
producer- gradually tightened export
restrictions on rare earth oxide
(REO).China has become the largest
country of rare-earth deposits, producer,
consumer and exporter and, there is a
growing demand-supply gap because of
a dearth of any other major supplying
nation. China’s imposition of export
quotas on several rare earth metals, on
the grounds that it needs the higher
quantities for its clean energy and high-
tech sectors, is squeezing an already
starved market. China wants rare-earths
companies to add value by making more
technologically advanced products rather
than exporting the raw material. While it
has cut foreign sale quotas of the minerals,
there are no restrictions on exports of
finished products.
Figure 8, shows the gross volume in
tonnes of exports of REEs which grew
from 6500 tonnes in 1990 to 57,400
tonnes in 2006 and declined to 49,000
tones in 2007, and 42,000 tonnes in
2008, respectively. It indicates that the
5.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
RARE EARTH ELEMENTS
Source: Reitausa.org, 2010
Figure 8: Gross volume of exports from 1979 to 2008
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gross volume of exports had been in a
growth trend until 2006, and then
declined in 2007 and 2008 mainly
because of the global financial crisis which
had very badly affected the major rare
earth consuming countries such as U.S,
Japan and Europe. Although, China
began to control exports of rare earth
products with quota administration since
1999, the total exports did not decrease
generally, until 2007 except a decline in
2001.
Figure 9, explains the gross value of
exports in million U.S dollar from 1990
to 2008. The total exports in value terms
also grew outstandingly, reaching to peak
level at about, USD 1.2 billion, in 2007,
while the export value was just 80 million
in 1990. From 1998 to 2005, the annual
average of gross value for exports was
about USD 420 million, and the annual
average of gross volume for exports was
about 46,946.63 tonnes, namely 8.98
USD/Kg. In 2007, the price was about
24 USD/Kg, which exuberantly increased
in the last months of 2010 to USD 60/
kg, and above.
Rare earth prices remained static for
decades due to plentiful supplies, lulling
the high-tech industry into a false sense
of security. After Beijing cut export quotas
by 70 percent for the second half of
2010, prices of some rare earths has gone
up, as much as 850 percent. Due to the
extensive management of rare earth
resource exploitation and scattered
distribution of the rare earth industry,
many foreign importers used the
opportunity to force down the price. When
the global demand for rare earth materials
increases year by year, China exported
6,100 tonnes of medium-end and low-end
rare earth products in 1990; the average
price was 13,600 USD/ton. In 2009,
China exported 36,100 tonnes of rare
earth smelting and separation products,
Source: Reitausa.org, 2010
Figure 9: Gross value of exports from 1979 to 2008
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rising by 16.67% YOY. The export value
amounted to USD 310 million and the
average price was only 8,959 USD/ton
(China Research and Intelligence, 2010).
Low prices for rare earth elements from
China, contributed to cuts at the
Mountain Pass mine in the United States,
one of the main source of supply for many
years, before it closed in 2002. They also
discouraged most entrants to the industry
until the last two years, when prices began
to climb because of strong demand.
The data from UNComtrade data base
shows that in 2009, a total of 43 countries
reported exports of rare earths. The entire
exports were valued at 427.75 million
US$ and 61232.32 tonnes of rare earths
were exported by the 43 countries. The
details of the top ten exporting countries
by volume in tonnes and value in million
US$ in 2009 have shown in table 13.
China including Hong Kong and Macao
exported about 39 thousand tonnes with
a share of more than 64 percent in 2009
followed by Japan exported 5904 tonnes
with a share of 9.64 percent and Russia
exported around 4619 tonnes in 2009.
Estonia and U.S were in the fourth and
fifth position respectively in terms export
volumes. Analysis of exports in value
terms shows that China including Hong
Kong and Macao accounted for slightly
more than 50% of the share of rare earths
exports by value. China was followed by
Japan with a share of around 23% and
Germany with a share of around 5%.
China therefore continued to be the
dominant exporter of rare earths both in
terms of volume and by value and China
for all purposes continues to be an
Table 12: Top ten exporters of rare earths by volume and value in 2009 (Million US$)
R e p o r t e r Exp Qty % Share by C o u n t r y E x p o r t % Exports
( To n n e s )  Qty Tonnes  Value  by Value
China+HK+Macao 39201.67 64.02 China+HK+Macao 240.97 50.97
Japan 5904.61 9.64 Japan 107.35 22.71
Russia Federation 4619.61 7.54 Germany 22.44 4.75
Estonia 2678.85 4.37 USA 15.36 3.25
USA 1332.50 2.18 France 14.02 2.96
France 1246.13 2.04 Norway 13.64 2.89
Austria 2578.62 4.21 Italy 11.80 2.50
Kazakhstan 1053.32 1.72 Estonia 10.38 2.20
Germany 657.55 1.07 Russia Federation 9.92 2.10
United Kingdom 555.85 0.91 United Kingdom 6.62 1.40
Source: UN Comtrade data base
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effective monopolistic supplier of rare
earths.
The details of the top ten importing
countries by quantity and value in million
US$ in 2009 are placed at table 13. In 2009
a total quantity of 69638.07 tonnes of rare
earths were imported by a total of 91
countries. United Sates was the top
importers of rare earths in terms of quantity
with Japan and Germany occupying second
and third positions. United Sates accounted
for 23.57% of the world’s share of rare earth
imports by quantity which was equal to
16416 tonnes. Japan imported 13490
tonnes and accounted 19.37 percent of the
total imports. Germany imported 8000
tonnes followed by France importing 6985
tonnes. The entire imports were valued at
608.48 million US$ 69638.07 tonnes of
rare earths were imported by the 91
countries. Japan was the largest importer
of rare earths in 2009 by value terms,
followed by USA, Thailand and Germany
respectively. Japan accounted for 25% of the
world’s rare earth imports.
The difference in quantity between
total rare earths exported and imported
amounts to 8405 tonnes. This difference
is very large and cannot be explained
away as statistical error. One possible
reason could be the belief that rare earths
are smuggled from China. Illicit exports
are typically in the form of REE mixed
with steel and exported as steel
composites. The process is reversed in the
country recovering the REE’s (British
Geological Survey, 2010).  In case the
smuggled REE’s are accounted for at the
receiving country either deliberately or
inadvertently, then some portion of this
discrepancy of around 8000 tonnes could
be partially explained.
Table 13: Top ten importers of rare earths by quantity and by value in 2009
Reporter Trade Qty % Imports Reporter Value US $ % Imports
Tonnes  Qty  Million by Value
USA 16416.371 23.57 Japan 152.12 25.00
Japan 13490.908 19.37 USA 115.03 18.90
Germany 8218.155 11.80 Thailand 67.51 11.09
France 6985.406 10.03 Germany 51.76 8.51
Austria 4456.6 6.40 France 40.57 6.67
Estonia 4124.822 5.92 China+HK 38.19 6.28
China+HK 4039.644 5.80 S. Korea 24.90 4.09
S. Korea 2632.811 3.78 Austria 21.62 3.55
Brazil 1314.483 1.89 Malaysia 11.29 1.86
Russia 1195.176 1.72 Italy 10.00 1.64
Source: UN Comtrade data base
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5.1 China’s Exports and Imports
In 2009, China exported a total of
38573.02 tonnes but the total of all the
rare earths exported to 46 countries added
up to 40982.13 tonnes. The quantity and
the percentage share of the top 10
customers of China is indicated in the
below table. United States was the largest
importer of Chinese rare earths by
quantity and imported around 14700
tonnes of rare earths, these accounted for
38% of the Chinese exports. Japan
imported around 10500 tonnes and its
share amounted to 27%. North America
(mainly the United States) and Asia each
account for around 36% of the Chinese
rare earth exports by quantity. Around
24% is exported to Europe.
China’s exports were valued at
239.37 million US$ in 2009. The details
of the top ten customers of China in
million US$ in 2009 are depicted in table
15. The largest importer of rare earths
from China was Japan with around 76
million US $, followed by the United Sates
with around 67 million US$. Japan and
the United Sates accounted for nearly 61%
of the exports of rare earths from China.
About 30% of the exports are accounted
by Hong Kong, France, Germany, South
Korea and Netherlands.
5.2 Rare Earth Export Control by
China
Several objectives motivate
implementing export restrictions on
strategic raw materials. In some cases,
these can be understood as a response to
market imperfections. The question
remains, however, whether export
Table 14: China’s top 10 customers by quantity and value in 2009
Partner Qty in % Partner Trade Value %
Tonnes Share million US$  Share
USA 14764.6 38.28 Japan 76.66 32.29
Japan 10519.71 27.27 USA 67.48 28.43
France 4391.593 11.39 Hong Kong 21.75 9.16
Hong Kong 2658.938 6.89 France 20.45 8.61
Italy 1509.58 3.91 Germany 15.58 6.56
Austria 1465.062 3.80 Rep. of Korea 8.40 3.54
Germany 1034.877 2.68 Netherlands 7.60 3.20
Australia 979.646 2.54 Italy 5.51 2.32
U.K 594.76 1.54 U.Kingdom 2.67 1.12
Netherlands 494.23 1.28 Other Asia 2.65 1.12
Source: UN Comtrade data base
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restrictions are the most effective tool to
achieve the desired outcomes. As many
of these raw materials are produced in a
limited number of countries, export
restrictions that are imposed in one
country may motivate other countries to
follow if importers massively move to buy
their raw materials. The restrictions
imposed by the first country then lose their
effectiveness. This can in principle lead
to a situation of competitive policy
practices – and of higher and higher export
taxes.
Many export restrictions are put into
place for environmental reasons or to
preserve natural resources. In other cases,
export restrictions are imposed in order
to encourage supply of raw materials to
domestic producers of downstream semi-
processed goods. On 23rd September
2010, exports of rare earth elements
(REEs) from China to Japan apparently
stopped due to a dispute over maritime
boundaries. This use of economic leverage
to influence policy raised concerns about
the impact of China’s strategic hold on
these precious metals. REEs have long
been considered the “enhancers” of global
products and are used to manufacture
defense and commercial high-technology
items. Their availability today, however,
could be jeopardized since China controls
over 97 percent of their production and
refinement (CSIS, 2010).
Until recently, the global dependency
on China for rare earths was a well-kept
secret. But word started to spread fast
after Beijing cut export quotas by 70 per
cent for the second half of 2010, sending
prices of some oxides - the purified form
of rare earth elements - up as much as
850 per cent. The need for alternative
supplies from outside China suddenly
became obvious. The Chinese dominance
has raised concerns within industry
regarding prices and lead times for critical
defense hardware. With demand
increasing, the problem of purchasing and
shipping REEs for products is
concurrently growing.
In the first week of July 2010, China
announced a number of changes affecting
the rare earths sector. These changes
included a reduction in the total amount
of rare earths that may be exported from
China besides other measures (Gareth P
Hatch, 2010). China has passed the
“2009-2015 Rare Earth Industry
Development Plan”. According to the
document, in the next six years, no new
rare earth mining permit will be
approved. The separation of newly formed
rare earth smelting companies will be
strictly reviewed. China has officially cited
environmental issues as one of the key
factors for its recent regulation on the
industry, but non-environmental motives
have also been imputed to China’s rare
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earth policy. According to The Economist,
“Slashing their exports of rare-earth
metals...is all about moving Chinese
manufacturers up the supply chain, so
they can sell valuable finished goods to
the world rather than lowly raw materials”
(The Economist, 2010). Foreign
companies also taking part in this
business of value additions. One possible
example is the division of General Motors
which deals with miniaturized magnet
research, which shut down its US office
and moved its entire staff to China in
2006. A news release in December 2010
announced that one Japanese company
had moved its magnet-producing industry
to China to take advantage of cheaper
prices and more certain supplies. This is
what the Chinese are trying to do; it’s just
good business.
5.3 Chinese Rare Earth Export
Quotas
China practices the quota license
administration on the export of rare earth
products since 1998 citing the need for
environmental management and resource
conservation. In recent years, Chinese
government cuts down the volume of
export enterprises, export quotas and
annual exploitation volume of rare earth
ores. The Beijing government argues that
its curbs are for environmental reasons
and to guarantee supplies to Chinese
clean-energy firms it is trying to promote
internationally. But it has also said its
dominance as a producer should give it
more control over global prices. China’s
Commerce Ministry allotted 14,446
tonnes of quotas to 31 companies, which
was 11.4 percent less than the 16,304
tonnes it allocated to 22 companies in the
first half of 2010 quotas a year ago. While
industrial users of the minerals in
industrialized countries face tighter
supplies and higher prices, China’s export
curbs have created opportunities to open
mines or revive dormant production in
Canada, Australia and the United States.
China cut its export quotas for rare earths
by 35 percent in the first round of permits
for 2011, threatening to extend a global
shortage of the minerals needed for smart
phones, hybrid cars and guided missiles.
Export quotas have been falling
continuously since 2005. The plan to
restrict rare earth exports were reportedly
commenced in 2005-06.The aim was to
restrict rare earth production in China to
around 80000 tonnes (People’s Daily,
2009). But the decline between 2008 and
2009 was quite drastic. There is wide-scale
concern that China may soon restrict or
even ban the export of particular rare
earths. There has been much speculation
about China’s future policy on rare earths.
However it is quite clear that China has
been systematically and methodically
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reducing quotas (Kara Hudai et all,
2010).
In 2010, it cuts down the export
quota to 30,258 tonnes, including 22,512
tonnes for domestic enterprises and 7,746
tonnes for foreign enterprises. The data
shows that the export quotas for 2010
have been reduced by 40% compared with
2009. This is a far greater reduction than
forecast that the reductions would be of
the order of 6-7% in the coming years.
The impact of the change will have far
reaching consequences, particularly
outside of China. Chinese rare earth
export quotas for 2010 are now
significantly less than rest of the world
(ROW) consumption having a gap of
18,000 tonnes. The quota for 2010 was
30,258t REO compared with ROW
demand of 50000t. Total ROW
production capacity is currently
10-12,000t at best, which indicates a
shortfall of 10-15,000 t at least in 2010.
China announced in December 2010 that
it will cut its export quotas for rare-earth
minerals by more than 11 percent in the
first half of 2011, further shrinking
supplies of metals needed to make a range
of high-tech products. The move comes
on the heels of a 40 percent slash in the
export quota on such minerals in 2010.
The export restraints have inflamed trade
ties with the United States, European
Union and Japan in particular (Tom Miles,
2011).
But a further reduction in quotas for
2011 issued late 2010 would be
consistent with recent Chinese policy. The
Chinese government typically makes a
main allocation of quotas near the end of
the year, followed by a smaller,
supplemental allocation in the summer.
But the supplemental allocation issued
last July was down 72 percent from a year
earlier, as Chinese officials called for
making sure that their own industries
Table 15: Chinese export quota and demand from rest of the world (ROW):
2005–2010. (tonnes REO)
Year Domestic Fore ign Total Change R O W
Companies Companies Demand
2005 48,048t 17,657t 65,609t   - 46,000t
2006 45,752t 16,069t 61,821t -6% 50,000t
2007 43574t 16,069t 59,643t -4% 50,000t
2008 40,987t 15,834t 56,939t -5.5% 50,000t
2009 33,300t 16845t 50,145t -12% 25,000t
2010 16304t for 5978t for 30,258t -40% 48,000t
1st half  1st half  2010
Sources: Kingsnorth, 2010, Hatch 2010
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had ample supplies and that heavily
polluting illegal mines should be closed.
According to the revised “2009 to 2015
Development Plan of the Rare Earth
Industry” prepared by the MIIT, the
annual REO export level from China will
be restricted below 35 kt between 2009
and 2015. If the aforementioned targets
can be strictly enforced, the existing
stockpiles outside China are expected to
be exhausted over time, which will further
strengthen China’s competitiveness. With
the current quota system, China does not
distinguish between the individual rare
earth oxides but limits the total tonnage
of exports across the board. That has led
to Chinese companies exporting as much
as possible of the high-value heavy rare
earths like dysprosium, instead of low-
value light rare earths like cerium.
5.4 Other Export Restrictions
Export restrictions are applied to
many of the rare earth metals originating
from China. Export restrictions come
in a variety of forms. They include
quantitative restrictions (quotas), export
taxes, duties and charges and mandatory
minimum export prices. In so far as they
can affect export volumes, the reduction
of VAT rebates as well as stringent export
licensing requirements may also be
considered forms of export restrictions. As
discussed before China has announced
several cuts in export quotas of rare earth
metals and raised export taxes to as high
as 25 percent, from zero to 15
percent previously (IER , 2011).
Export Taxes on Rare Earth Exports
from China
In late 2006, the Chinese government
introduced a tax on rare earth exports of
10%, which was increased to 15% on
selected rare earths in 2007. Effective from
1 January 2008, export taxes were raised
to the following levels
China has added a 15- to 25-percent
export duty on rare earth exports and
41 rare earth products have been listed
in the category of prohibited processing
trade. Rare earth exporters, including
Table 16: Chinese export taxes on rare earths
Materials Tax (%)
Europium, terbium, dysprosium, yttrium as oxides,
carbonates or chlorides 25%
All other rare earth oxides, carbonates and chlorides 15%
Neodymium metal 15%
All other rare earth metals 25%
Ferro rare earth alloys 20%
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10 foreign companies, are facing stricter
supervision on their qualification. The
move is an increase from the 15 percent
temporary export tax on neodymium,
used in batteries for hybrid cars including
Toyota Motor Corp.’s Prius. Lanthanum,
also used in hybrids, and cerium, used
for polishing semiconductors, were not
taxed in 2010, and will be taxed at 25
percent in 2011, the Chinese ministry
reported in December 2010. China’s
export tax for dysprosium will be kept at
25 percent next year, and the same with
terbium, according to the statement of
China’s finance ministry.
In 2007, China withdrew the refund
of VAT (16%) on exports of unimproved
rare earths, while the refund on higher
value-added exports such as magnets
and phosphors remains in place. The
effect of this decision, combined with the
export tax regime above, is that non-
Chinese rare earth processors such as
cerium polishing powder producers and
rare earth magnet producers pay 31%
more for rare earth raw materials (plus
transport and storage costs) than their
Chinese counterparts.
In other cases, export restrictions are
imposed in order to encourage supply of
raw materials to domestic producers of
downstream semi-processed goods. In
the years prior to the 2008 downturn
Chinese exports of rare earth compounds
were declining while exports of metals
and alloys were increasing slightly.
In 2008 and 2009, China began
implementing regulations to place greater
controls on the rare earth industry. For
example, the Ministry of Land and
Resources implemented a regulation in
2009 that would “protect and make
rational use of China’s superior natural
resources,” in particular, tungsten,
antimony, and rare earth ores. According
to the regulation, the Ministry of Land
and Resources is suspending any
applications nationwide for survey or
mining licenses for rare earth ores. The
goal for controlling the rare earth industry
in China is “to prevent over-exploitation
and blind competition, and to advance
the effective protection and scientific,
rational use of these superior mineral
resources.” The Chinese argue that the
REM industry is unsustainable and is rife
with environmental externalities that
ultimately take a toll on the public. They
maintain that export restrictions are in
place to reflect the true price of REMs and
their ecological costs, while protecting the
environment from overexploitation and
illegal mining operations (ICTSD, 2010).
Most of the analysts argue that, if China
causes a shortage of rare earths, it will be
a temporary shortage, since the rising
prices for rare earth elements will serve
as an incentive for others to enter the
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market, leading to greater supply. The
United States, for example, has 13
percent of known rare earth reserves and
could get back into the production and
refining business. Still, there will be a
lag before new production becomes
available, and it could easily come from
an equally troubling source. After China,
Russia has the next largest reserves (19
percent), and it is at least as likely (if
not more so) to play games with export
restrictions, and have more lax safety
and environmental standards as well
(New York Times, 2010). Countries that
rely on Rare Earth Metals (REMs) for
manufacturing are lashing out at China
after Beijing officially announced a
further 35 percent reduction in export
quotas. The cut, which will affect exports
for the first half of 2011, follows a 72
percent reduction in REM exports in the
second half of 2010.
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D espite the rising demand and thehistorical high prices reached by
many commodities, mine capacity
expansions and new mine production
capacity have not kept pace. Overall, the
price of minerals is driven by multiple
physical, financial and political factors.
When deciphering price data and trends,
it is helpful to know whether there is a
market surplus or deficit and the extent
of the imbalance. Physical parameters
(e.g., stock changes, closures of old mines
and the start-up of new ones) are in turn
influenced by general economic conditions
and financial forecasts (e.g., inflation and
exchange rates) that inform investor
sentiments. Unanticipated shocks- such
as monopolistic or oligopolistic pricing
(e.g., export quotas); geopolitics and
natural disasters- also play a role in
affecting physical and financial
parameters.
6.1 Negotiated Pricing and Metal
Exchanges
Most rare, precious, minor and specialty
metals and their alloys are traded through
bilateral contracts based on negotiated
pricing between parties. The fragmented
nature of some of these markets and the
remoteness of some producers has resulted
in traders playing a dominant role.
Regionally, traders account for a large part
of the specialty metal supply coming out
of regions such as China, the former Soviet
Union and Africa. The nature of the
process limits price disclosure in these
markets and the prices of specialty metals
quoted by traders and consultants vary
widely in their reliability (U.S Department
of Energy, 2010). To understand the price
behavior and volatility of key materials,
it is also important to examine the ways
in which these commodities are bought
and sold, in conjunction with whether
they are produced as a co- or byproduct
of other specialty metals (e.g., REEs) or a
by-product of a major metal. Both aspects
influence the price behavior and volatility
of a mineral. The influences of these
factors can be gleaned from a comparison
between the historical price trends of
commodities produced as a byproduct of
metals traded on major exchanges and
6.  REE PRICING AND
PRICE MOVEMENTS
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commodities mainly transacted through
bi-lateral contracts.
For now, the demand/supply equation
has been wildly swayed, and prices have
rocketed. It has been widely reported that
the Chinese authorities plan to implement
a ‘fully unified pricing mechanism’ in order
to control the price of rare earths
throughout the country. On closer
inspection, the proposed mechanism
seems to apply only to the Fujian,
Guangdong, Hunan and Jiangxi
provinces, and the Guangxi autonomous
region, at this time. These five
jurisdictions are adjacent to one another
in the southeast of China, an area whose
elution deposited/ ion-absorbed clays are
rich in the heavy rare earth elements.
Inner Mongolia and other northern
jurisdictions, which predominantly
produce light rare earths, do not appear
to be covered by the announcement. It
would thus appear that the change is an
attempt by the authorities to specifically
control the prices of the more valuable
heavy rare earths (Gareth P Hatch,
2010). Some would argue that China is
already well in control of rare earth pricing
with more than 90 percent market share,
Chinese firms already control prices.
Are the Chinese looking to actively
manipulate the price of rare earths? To
assume that ‘the Chinese’, in some unified
conspiracy, are working to throttle back
rare earth supply and raise prices would
be incorrect and there are certainly some
Chinese rare earth companies that
recognize they will get the best pricing for
material outside China, and would love
to use their expertise to help establish
operations outside China. This would
allow these Chinese companies to more
directly reap the benefit of worldwide
demand. Problems associated with future
pricing of rare earths will affect different
parts of the supply chain differently.
Supply risks, at least in the short-to-
medium term, are less associated with the
prospect of increasing prices because
in most cases the cost of these elements
is a small part of the final product
manufacturing cost. However, in the last
6-12 months the price of many rare earth
elements has increased by approximately
Table 17: Purchase option and source of price information for REEs
Minerals Purchase option Source of price info
Rare Earth
Elements
Negotiated purchase, not traded on metal
exchanges and therefore no spot market;
however, illegally traded REEs are sold through
less formal channels and may possibly be sold





RARE EARTH ELEMENTS IN CHINA: GROWTH, STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS
45
300-700%, which in some cases has had
a more significant impact on the price of
the final product.
6.2 Rare Earths Price Movements
Rare earth prices remained static for
decades due to plentiful supplies, lulling
the high-tech industry into a false sense of
security. After Beijing cut export quotas
by 70 percent for the second half of 2010,
prices of some rare earths gone up as much
as 850 percent. When the global demand
for rare earth materials increases year by
year, China exported 6,100 tonnes of
medium-end and low-end rare earth
products in 1990; the average price was
13,600 USD/ton. In 2009, China exported
36,100 tonnes of rare earth smelting and
separation products, rising by 16.67%
YOY. The export value amounted to USD
310 million and the average price was only
8,959 USD/ton (China Research and
Intelligence, 2010:3). Low prices for rare
earth elements from China contributed to
cuts at the Mountain Pass mine in U.S one
of the main source of supply for many years
before it closed in 2002. They also
discouraged most entrants to the industry
until the last two years, when prices began
to climb because of strong demand.
2008 marked the peak in China’s rare
earth industry. However, in 2009, due to
the economic downturn, demand fell
sharply. Prices fell due to oversupply on the
international market and price wars among
Chinese suppliers, in particular smaller
players. Since 2005, the Chinese
government has been imposing export
quotas on many of the rare earth metals,
resulting in reduced global supply. Higher
prices are a natural result of such supply
restrictions. The latest data reveals that,
China’s exports of rare earth metals burst
through the $100,000-per-tonne mark for
the first time in February 2011, up almost
nine fold from a year before, while the
volume of trade stayed far below historical
averages and each tonne fetched a mere
$14,405 on average. The apparent price
rises have averaged $10,000 per tonne per
month but accelerated in February 2011,
galloping ahead by $34,000 per tonne,
according to Reuters calculations based on
data from China’s Customs office (Tom
Miles, 2011). The explosion in export values
has coincided with a collapse in volumes
coming out of China, the source of almost
the entire world’s rare earth supplies, which
has cut export quotas of the 17 rare earth
metals and raised tariffs on exports.
Figure 10 illustrates the historical
average prices of individual rare earth
oxides between 2001 and 2010. REE
prices have raised threefold overall since
2001. This period covers the 2001
recession, which had lingering effects until
2003, and the 2008– 2009 recession. Two
things to note are that the heavier rare
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earths (e.g., dysprosium, terbium and
europium) are relatively more expensive,
and that prices have risen fairly steadily
since 2003 due to China’s rising domestic
demand and escalating export controls.
The price jumps from 2009–2010 can
perhaps be attributed to a reduction in
China’s rare earth export quota. The export
quota which is for total rare earth exports,
resulted in higher prices for REO exports.
This led to an unexpected fall in China’s
export of LREEs which are generally lower
priced. As a result of the greater scarcity of
light rare earths, the price of LREEs rose
much more than the HREEs. Rare earth
oxide and rare earth metal prices track
closely, with the prices for metals always
higher (though relatively more so for some
rare earth elements than others) (British
Geological Survey, 2010).
After soaring in recent years, rare earth
prices have virtually skyrocketed in 2010.
Cerium, for example, jumped from on
average USD 3.88 per kg in 2009 to USD
50 per kg at beginning of November
2010, while the average price of
lanthanum increased tenfold between
2009 and 2010. Terbium and Europium,
on the other hand, recorded relatively
modest increases of only 7% and 23%.
Unlike the conventional metals, rare
earths are not traded at the exchange. As
a result, pricing is highly obscure, and
there is no way for either producers or
consumers to hedge prices. Neodymium
prices quintupled at the same time to $23
a pound and slumped before almost fully
recovering last quarter of 2010. The price
of neodymium oxide, also used in
magnets in BlackBerrys, has surged more
than four- fold to $88.5 a kilogram from
$19.12 in 2009 because of rising demand
and reduced supply from China, according
to Sydney-based Lynas Corp., which is
building a A$550 million ($542 million)
rare earths mine in Western Australia.
Figure 10: REO prices from 2001–2010
Source: Lynas Corp 2010
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As discussed before the two heavy rare
earths, dysprosium and terbium are in
short supply, mainly because they have
emerged as the miracle ingredients of
green energy products. Tiny quantities of
dysprosium can make magnets in electric
motors lighter by 90 percent, while
terbium can help cut the electricity usage
of lights by 80 percent. According to a
new United States Energy Department
report, the most important of these for
clean energy is dysprosium. Its price is
now $132 a pound compared with $6.50
a pound in 2003. Terbium prices
quadrupled from 2003 to 2008, peaking
at $407 a pound, before slumping in the
global economic crisis to $205 a
pound.
While the long-term price of the light
rare earths remains open for debate, the
quotas will continue to tighten the supply
of heavy rare earths like terbium and
dysprosium, sending prices soaring.
Dysprosium oxide, used in hybrid
vehicles, lasers and nuclear reactors, is
already selling for $284 a kg and that is
projected to rise to over $400 in the next
couple of years, according to Asian Metals.
The rising prices have been a cause for
concern in importing nations, which have
become reliant on affordable REMs from
China. The recent controversy over
Figure 11: Rare earth prices have multiplied over a short period of time.
Source: Lynas Corp, Commerzbank Corporates and markets
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China’s clampdown has prompted prices
such as cerium oxide to climb by 700
percent in less than a year. In light of
China’s virtual monopoly of the REM
market, critics have argued that the
country is simply flexing its economic
muscle.
The figure 12 shows that the prices
dropped continuously as supply from
China increased substantially up to 2000.
The 1992 was the year when Deng
Xiaoping famously stated, “the Middle
East has oil, and China has rare earths”,
since then, China has not only remained
the world’s largest REO producer, but has
also successfully moved its manufacturers
up the supply chain. During this period
rare earth investment at state, provincial
and local levels also increased as china
dominated the market. When the prices
were fallen too short at the international
market, the mountain pass mine in
California the main supplier of REEs till
early 1990s was unable to cope with the
escalating cost and finally shut down its
operation in 2002 also during this decade
the major buyers of rare earths such as
U.S, Japan and Europe switched the
purchase to China.
During 2000 to 2006 prices again went
down; however from 2003, the price started
to increase slightly and it is unlikely to be
seen the prices again at this level. The major
drivers that had an impact on setting the
prices on this period were the high level of
competition within China and handful of
Figure 12: Historic supply, demand and pricing
Source: Lynas Corp, 2010
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powerful buyers in Japan, USA and Europe.
During this period the number of producers
in China reduced from 600 to 150
companies by mergers and acquisition and
there were little regulation from government
side and there were no investment in
environmental compliance within the
Chinese rare earth Industry. This period also
witnessed reducing supply from other
countries along with over all demand
growing from 2003 onwards after
sluggishness in demand from 2000 to
2003.
The figure also shows that from 2003
onwards the prices started to increase again
and there was a steep rise in prices in 2007-
2008 due to changing market conditions
in China. The major drivers of the price
during this time were the temporary crack
down on environmental standards which
resulted in the temporary closure of
multiple producers. Cost increasing in
China due to the start of environmental
compliance, as well labour, energy and
chemical costs increasing and tightening
between demand and supply also
contributed in increasing prices.
In 2009 the price moved down mainly
because of the demand sharply dropped
due to global financial crisis while global
supply almost remained at the same level.
However as the economies started to
Figure13: Future outlook and price drivers
Structural change in industry has commenced
Source: Lynas Corp, 2010
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recover and by the end of 2009 the prices
started to increase again not only because
of the global recovery but a number
internal policies that China adopted
related to rare earth industry. China
started the consolidation of production
and marketing channels that restricted
Chinese supply and demand recovering
strongly after GFC induced the prices to
increase inside China and consequently
increasing the international prices.
The figure 13 shows the future trend
in demand, supply and prices up to 2014.
There would be a number of factors that
affects the price movements both in
Chinese domestic market and
international level. Assuming current
trends continue, new projects are developed
and there is a ‘balance’ in supply and
demand for individual rare earths through
extra supply. The Challenges for 2014 will
be the tight supply and ‘balance’ between
demand supply will still be an issue; so
prices for Tb, Dy and Y will remain strong.
And other issues include, can the rare earths
industry in China be successfully
controlled? And will the first of the new
non-Chinese projects be successfully built
and commissioned?
The impact of Chinese interventions
in the domestic industry such as implicit
assistance to domestic downstream
processors of the targeted products and
thus providing them a competitive
advantage will have an impact on the
prices. China is seeking sustainability and
prices will respond to market demand and
supply from a sustainable base. Estimates
from Chinese government reports shows
that the “Chinese price” for rare earths is
about ¼ of the price that would result from
an environmentally sound, worker friendly,
profitable operation. This means that the
“real” price of rare earths is about four
times higher than the current China price.
An entire set of “green” industries have
grown up over the past ten years in reliance
on that China price. The danger is that as
the China price is phased out, many of these
green industries will prove to be
unprofitable. A primary example of this
risk is the electric car. Since the China price
for rare earths is virtually certain to be
phased out very quickly, this risk is quite
real (Steve Dickinson, 2010). However,
technological change often brings sharp
changes in demand, which, in turn, may
lead to strong price volatility. An example
is the tantalum capacitor industry. Two-
thirds of world tantalum production is used
in electronic components. When the
tantalum price increased sharply in the late
1990s, the electronics industry encouraged
capacitor designers to improve their
niobium capacitors and multiple ceramics
capacitors in order to replace the tantalum
components. The demand for tantalum,
and its price, fell sharply as a result.
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F or China rare earth is the wildcard  now. The Chinese
government has stated that its reserves
of rare earths are finite and, therefore, they
will be developed for the prime benefit of
China’s manufacturing industry. To help
generate manufacturing jobs and move up
the value chain, a series of measures has
been implemented to “conserve resources
and to maximize the benefits” of its rare
earths endowment. With a near monopoly
in REO production, the magnitude of the
projected shortage and its effects on
industrial end users across the globe will
be heavily influenced in the short and
medium term by China’s production and
export policies.
China has officially cited
environmental issues as one of the key
factors for its recent regulation on the
industry, but non-environmental motives
have also been imputed to China’s rare
earth policy. According to The Economist,
“Slashing their exports of rare-earth
metals...is all about moving Chinese
manufacturers up the supply chain, so
they can sell valuable finished goods to
the world rather than lowly raw materials
(The Economist, 2010). Although often
needed only in small quantities, these
metals are increasingly essential to the
development of technologically
sophisticated products. They play a critical
role in the development of innovative
“environmental technologies” to boost
energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. Hydrogen-fuel based cars,
for example, require platinum-based
catalysts; electric-hybrid cars need lithium
batteries; and rhenium super alloys are
an indispensable input for modern
aircraft production. In addition, there are
few substitutes available in the short-term
for these raw materials.
The study finds that, a major
ongoing issue for the rare earths
industry is the balance. Due to the
absurdity between the supply and
demand of individual rare earths, there
always exists a situation in which there
is a shortfall of some rare earths while
others are in surplus. On the basis of
known analyses of major resources it is
considered that some of the ‘heavy’ rare
earths are more likely to be in short
supply in the future.
7.  CONCLUSIONS
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Although production of some
strategic minerals is very concentrated,
this does not necessarily suggest that
future production will be similarly
geographically restrained. The future
production situation is mixed. For some
strategic minerals, the reserve base is more
geographically concentrated than the
present production. For others, the raw
materials are more widely dispersed. In
the case of some of the most concentrated
raw materials, particularly those largely
found in China, such as rare earths, the
future reserves are less concentrated than
present production would suggest.
Since early 90s, Chinese rare earth
producers have had an unregulated
approach to the supply in the
international market. This has been
exploited by a concentrated number of
buyers who have collaborated to force
prices down. As China gradually increased
its bargaining power by restricting supply
with tightening market, rare earth prices
have improved significantly over the
years.  Whilst the next 5 to 10 years, global
demand will surpass supply, China Rare
Earth export quotas will play a critical
element in the supply chain of rare earths
out side China.
There are few basic features of Chinese
supply that we can derive from the above
analysis. The main aspects include, China
still hold more than 36 million tonnes of
rare earth oxide reserves, excessive
secondary processing capacity and
easy availability of cheap processing
chemicals, and heavy investment in
research and technology. However the
supply of Chinese heavy rare earth is finite
with 15- 20 years of mine life and Chinese
are rigorously regulating the mines on
environmental grounds.
To control the supply China has
introduced a number of measures such
as imposing 15 percent of taxes on light
rare earths oxides and neodymium metal
and, 25 percent tax on heavy rare earths
and other metals. Government has
recommended that the management of
rare earth mines should be consolidated
under three four main enterprises and has
stepped up efforts to restructure the rare
earth industry and has introduced
favorable policies, and is encouraging
acquisitions and mergers to restructure
the sector. According to plans, the Chinese
government will bring down the number
of rare earth companies from 90 to 20
within 2015. These measures will have
short – medium term repercussions in the
international market and industrial
applications.
There is no rare earth source that can
match the Baotou tailings dump, these
deposits can be found all over the world.
China’s actions have put this issue firmly
on the radar screen and countries are
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getting serious about developing new
sources. Several new overseas mine
projects are in the pipeline but few are
likely to be able to compete with China
on prices. Besides, it would require at least
a decade before new mines can make an
impact on the global market and the
study shows that China will continue to
control the global market for some time
to come.
China’s control over rare earth
elements has the potential to increase
foreign dependence on China for finished
goods. China has adopted various policies
to further develop the rare earth industry
at its roots. China’s vision is to increase
industrial utilization of rare earth
elements and control the market of rare
earth applications.
China recognized the strategic value
of its RE resources long before the days
of Deng Xiaoping. With skill, patience
and investment China has transformed
the Rare Earth industry into what it is
today. Government support of advanced
curricula in RE sciences has produced
thousands of technical professionals
employed in RE industry today.
China’s moves are creating panic in
the rare earth sector and its efforts to
monopolize the sector will backfire since
the nation’s policy makers seem to have
failed to realize that such high-handed
measures are uniting the rest of the world
against China. Business partners and
prospective investors will insist on tougher
terms of contract or develop other ways
to protect their business interests.
Most of the analysts argue that, if China
causes a shortage of rare earths, it will be a
temporary shortage, since the rising prices
for rare earth elements will serve as an
incentive for others to enter the market,
leading to greater supply. The United States,
for example, has 13 percent of known rare
earth reserves and could get back into the
production and refining business. Still, there
will be a lag before new production becomes
available, and it could easily come from an
equally troubling source. After China,
Russia has the next largest reserves (19
percent), and it is at least as likely (if not
more so) to play games with export
restrictions, and have more lax safety and
environmental standards as well.
According to Financial Times, China
wants to forge a new phase of globalization
where many of the roads – financial,
commercial and perhaps eventually
political- converge on Beijing. China is
not seeking a rupture with the
international economic system (although
some foreign companies are fearful of a
technology grab). But it is looking to
mould more of the rules, institutions and
economic relationships that are at the core
of the global economy. It is trying to forge
post-American globalization.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
54
While China says its deposits of rare-
earth minerals account for only about a
third of the global total, the country mines
most of the world’s marketed supply,
which has raised concerns that China
could deplete the supply too quickly. The
move to build reserves comes as China’s
supply of rare-earth metals to the rest of
the world already is shrinking despite
growing demand for the elements. In
response to Chinese restrictions on supply
the high-tech-focused nations of U.S, The
European Union, Japan and South Korea,
all of which are dependent on China for
rare-earth supplies, have highlighted
stockpiling strategies.
High-technology and environmental
applications of the rare earth elements
have grown dramatically in diversity and
importance over the past four decades.
Many of these applications are highly
specific and substitutes for REE’s are
inferior or unknown. REE’s have acquired
a level of technological significance much
greater than expected from their relative
anonymity.
If new supplies of rare earths do not
come online within the next 10 years, a
global shortage would likely to affect new
energy industry such as wind turbine,
solar panels, electric vehicle production
and electronics. According to the U.S
government report, the issue even carries
national security implications because of
the rare earth content in many advanced
military weapons, the economic threat of
depending on a single country and getting
new sources of supply into production is
not that easy. Rare earth elements are
needed for China’s expansion of its own
military needs (aircraft carriers, nuclear-
powered submarines, and ballistic
missiles). Home-grown production needs
will further cut exports already reduced
to crippling levels. Not surprisingly, these
measures have raised real concerns outside
of China regarding the future availability
of the refined products created from
REMs.
China has been strategically
motivated in the development of many
new high tech applications which have
helped quadruple the size of the RE
market since 1990. Chinese economy will
continue to grow near double digit rates
for the foreseeable future and disposable
income for automobiles, personal
electronics, etc will drive the internal
demand for REs significantly. China is
already overtaken U.S as the largest auto
market and expected to produce 500,000
electric vehicles in 2011and also leads in
wind power generation. So to meet this
increasing demand for REEs, China will
gradually reduce the exports.
So to summarize
♦ China’s RE reserves are finite.
♦ Chinese internal demand for RE
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materials and technologies is
forecasted to continue growing at
double digit rates for the foreseeable
future.
♦ These conditions will continue to drive
Chinese policies to limit RE
production and exports to better
manage its precious natural resource.
♦ China already produces 80% of global
requirement for fully dense RE
permanent magnets and 100% of the
global RE metal requirement for all
RE permanent magnets (fully dense
and bonded) produced.
♦ Prospects of the Chinese expanding
RE raw material output beyond its
own internal demand only appears to
make sense if China can leverage this
increased production to bring more
downstream manufacturing into the
country (more magnets, motors and
motor assemblies for example)
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